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Abstract 
 
Public safety and acceptance is extremely important for the nuclear power 
renaissance to get started. The Advanced Burner Reactor and other potential designs 
utilize liquid sodium as a primary coolant which provides distinct challenges to the 
nuclear power industry. Fire is a dominant contributor to total nuclear plant risk 
events for current generation nuclear power plants. Utilizing past experience to 
develop suitable safety systems and procedures will minimize the chance of sodium 
leaks and the associated consequences in the next generation. An advanced 
understanding of metal fire behavior in regards to the new designs will benefit both 
science and industry.  This report presents an extensive literature review that captures 
past experiences, new advanced reactor designs, and the current state-of-knowledge 
related to liquid sodium combustion behavior. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
4S  Super Safe, Small, and Simple 
ABR  Advanced Breeder Reactor 
ABTR  Advanced Breeder Test Reactor 
ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
CRS  Central Receiver System 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
FUANA Beschreibung der Forschungsanlage zur Untersuchung nuklearer Aerosole 
FBR  Fast Breeder Reactor 
FBTR  Fast Breeder Test Reactor 
GNEP  Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
HCDA  Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident 
IGCAR Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 
IHX  Intermediate Heat Exchanger 
JAEA  Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
JSFR  Japan Sodium Fast Reactor 
KfK  Kernforschungzentrum Karlsruhe, Germany 
LBB  Leak Before Break 
LMFBR Light Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 
LOCO  Loss of Coolant Accident 
LWR  Light Water Reactor 
MOX  Mixed oxide 
NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
ODS  Oxide dispersion Strengthened 
R&D  Research and Development 
SAPFIRE Safety Phenomenology Tests on Sodium Leak,Fire and Aerosols  
SFR  Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor 
SNL  Sandia National Laboratories 
SSPS  Small Solar Power Systems 
TRU  Trans-uranic  
 
Chemical Formulas 
 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide  
Na  Sodium 
Na2O  Sodium Oxide 
NaOH  Sodium Hydroxide 
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Symbols 
 
atm  Standard Atmosphere 
bar  Atmospheric Unit 
°C  Degrees Centigrade 
cc  Cubic Centimeter 
g  Gram 
h  Hour 
K  Degrees Kelvin  
kg  Kilo-gram 
lb  Pound 
Pa  Pascal 
Re  Reynolds Number 
s  Second 
m  Meter 
mm  Millimeter 
MWe  Megawatt Electric 
psig  Pounds Per Square Inch 
μm  Micrometer 
vol  Volume  
W  Watt 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The anticipated nuclear power renaissance hinges on public acceptance and a 
demonstrated treatment of potential safety issues, particularly for advanced reactor designs.  The 
Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) uses a liquid sodium primary coolant as do certain other 
advanced reactor concepts. In contrast to today’s Light Water Reactors (LWRs), liquid-metal-
cooled reactors present a unique risk; namely, potential metal fires involving the sodium coolant.   
 
Fire is a significant contributor to total nuclear plant risk for current generation LWRs.  
Given “passively safe” advanced designs, some elements of plant risk will diminish 
substantially. Fires could represent the dominant risk contributor, especially given the unique 
characteristics of metal fires such as very high temperatures and fire suppression challenges.  
Fast breeder reactors all over the world use liquid sodium as a coolant and there has been 
experimental and analytical research done related to sodium fires as early as the 1950’s.  The 
research has included fundamental studies, work on droplet combustion, pool burning, 
suppression, and large-scale sodium fire experiments.  However, there are gaps in our 
understanding of the basic combustion behavior and combustion mechanics due to the 
complexities involved.  These gaps have led to little progress in understanding the basic 
combustion behaviors for sodium. (Makino 2006).  Many of these same concerns were noted as 
far back as 1972 (Newman 1972).   
 
 New technologies have substantially improved fire computer modeling capabilities, but 
to apply these tools to a sodium fire will require some additional model development and 
validation work.  Unfortunately, most of the experiments performed in the past cannot be used to 
support model development today.  Clear definition of the experimental boundary and initial 
conditions are necessary to create the modeled conditions, and most of the experimental results 
lack this information.  “Reports of precise conditions in experiments are rare in the literature,” so 
the heat transfer evaluations have almost been impossible (Makino 2006).   
 
 This report includes four elements.  First, a comprehensive review will define the current 
state of knowledge for metal fires.  This will include actual metals fire experience in various 
applications. Second, an assessment of advanced reactor concept designs and identification of the 
unique metal fire safety and hazards was completed. A number of potential safety scenarios exist 
and will be grouped as to potential importance and representative physics to prioritize the 
specific research directions that will maximize breadth of applicability to emerging reactor 
designs. Third, a detailed review of sodium combustion research and potential approaches to the 
design and conduct of future experiments will be presented.  Fourth, Appendix A presents an 
annotated bibliography of relevant literature identified during extensive literature review.       
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2. PREVIOUSLY RECORDED SODIUM FIRE ACCIDENTS 
 
This chapter describes past sodium fires at nuclear reactors and other sodium facilities.  
The incidents discussed in this chapter were chosen to highlight the most significant issues 
surrounding sodium fires.  These issues include design defects at startup (Monju), pipe bursts 
(BN-600), sodium spray fires (Almeria), and sodium-concrete interactions (ILONA)1.   
 
2.1 Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor 
 
 The Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) first reached criticality in 1994.  
Powered operation began in 1995, and a series of power raising tests were performed, with a 
planned full-power test planned for June 1996.  Monju is a loop-type 280 MWe sodium-cooled 
reactor with mixed oxide fuel (Mikami 1996).  During normal operation, the inlet and outlet 
sodium temperatures in the primary coolant loop are 397 °C and 529 °C, respectively.  Sodium 
temperatures in the secondary coolant loop range between 325-505 °C. 
 
 During a scheduled power rating test (40% electrical power) on December 8, 1995, a high 
sodium temperature alarm sounded at the outlet of the secondary side of the intermediate heat 
exchanger (IHX) (Mikami 1996).  At the same time, smoke detectors sounded in the same area, 
closely followed by a sodium leak detection alarm.  Operators began normal plant shut-down 
procedures, but after increased smoke was observed 50 minutes later, it was decided to manually 
trip the reactor.  This shutdown occurred approximately 1.5 hours after the initial alarms 
sounded.   
 
 Investigations later confirmed that a sodium leak and fire had occurred, ultimately, the 
source of the leak was traced to a damaged temperature sensor (pictured in Figure 1).  The sensor 
consists of thermocouple wires housed in a protective well tube.  It was found that the tip of the 
well tube had broken off and the thermocouple was bent at an angle of 45 degrees toward the 
downstream flow direction.  
Thermocouple
Insulation
Pipe Wall
Gap for monitoring Na leakage
Sodium
Leak
Bent at an
angle of ~45°
Sodium Flow Direction
Well Tube
(Lost)
 
Figure 1:  Sodium Leak Conditions at Monju.  Adapted from (Mikami 1996). 
                                                 
1 The acronym was not obtainable in the literature. 
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 A microscopic inspection of the flow tube was performed to determine the root cause of 
the leak.  It was concluded that the breakage of the well tube was caused by high cycle fatigue 
due to flow induced vibration in the direction of sodium flow.  It was found that the problems 
were rooted in the design of the well tube.  Although designers applied ASME standards to 
prevent resonant vibrations, they failed to take into account the sharp taper of the Monju tube 
design.  As a result, the vortex-induced vibration could not be prevented.  The design has 
subsequently been re-evaluated.   
 
 In addition to replacing all similarly designed temperature sensors, aspects of sodium fire 
response and emergency operation procedures were also modified at the Monju site.  For 
example, the reactor will be shut down immediately if a sodium leak is confirmed in the future.  
A summary of the Monju Improvement Plan is shown in Table 1 (Mikami 1996).  As this event 
was confined to the secondary coolant loop, there was no radiological release that affected either 
the general public or the plant personnel.  However, it has resulted in over a decade of safety 
reviews in order to re-establish both technical surety and public confidence in the plant.  The 
Monju plant is scheduled to resume operation in mid-2008.  
 
Table 1: Monju Improvement Program.  Adapted from (Mikami 1996). 
 
Monju Improvement Program 
(1) Prevention of Sodium 
Leak 
• Replacement of the same 
type of temperature 
sensors 
• To secure safety of other 
types of sensors and 
other structures 
(2) Grasp Situation of 
Leakage 
• Installation of new 
monitoring system  
• Improvement of fire 
detection & sodium 
leak detection systems 
(3) Suppression of 
Leakage 
• Early shutdown of 
reactor 
• Early drainage of 
sodium 
 
(4) Mitigation of Effects by 
Leaked Sodium 
• Improvement of ventilating 
system and early suspension 
of operation 
(5) Review of Operation 
Management 
• Create supervisor for 
sodium technology 
• Create substantial 
education and training 
system 
• Strengthen emergency 
response organization 
 
(6) Safety Review 
• Inspection of 
equipment and 
facilities 
• Learn from foreign 
experience and 
reflection 
 
(7) Confirm Safety of 
FBR system 
(8) Improvement of sodium 
technology 
• Establishment of 
Technology Development 
Center 
• Training of operation and 
maintenance 
 
 
2.2 BN-600 Fast Reactor 
 
 The BN-600 sodium fast reactor began operation in 1980.  It is part of the Beloyarsk 
nuclear power plant located in Zarechny town, Svedlovsk Region, Russia.  The BN-600 is a 
pool-type 600 MWe reactor with oxide fuel (Buksah 1997).  The inlet and outlet sodium 
temperatures in the primary flow region are 337 °C and 550 °C, respectively.  Sodium 
temperatures in the secondary cooling circuit range between 328-518 °C.  During shutdown for 
refueling and maintenance, the primary coolant temperature is maintained in the 220-250 °C 
range. 
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 Over its operational lifetime, the BN-600 plant has experienced numerous sodium leaks 
and associated fires despite the attention paid to leak prevention and fire safety.  These leaks 
predominantly occurred in the early years of reactor operation. It was noted that out of the 27 
documented sodium leaks, fire was observed in 14 cases.  The causes of these leaks are listed 
below (Buksah 1997). 
 
• Cracks in pipelines (6 cases) 
• Failure of steam generator sodium valves (5 cases) 
• Defects of flange joints (5 cases) 
• Wrong sequence procedures of melting sodium in the pipeline (4 cases) 
• Manufacture defect (3 cases) 
• Holes made by personnel (2 cases) 
• Sodium valve crack (2cases) 
 
 The largest primary sodium leak occurred on October 7, 1993.  The total amount of 
sodium escaping during the event was estimated to be 1000 liters.  The leak originated on the 
pipeline for sodium removal from the cold trap.  The first indication of a leak was a short-circuit 
in the electric heating systems surrounding the pipe.  Rising radioactivity was then detected in 
the exhaust ventilation air duct, triggering an automatic activation of isolation valves and an 
initiation of the fire-ventilation system.  Despite these measures, radiation levels in the vent stack 
and reactor buildings continued to rise.  As a result, the primary sodium purification system was 
completely isolated from the system and the reactor was shut down. 
 
 During the incident, plant personnel followed operating procedures and the sodium leak 
detection and fire mitigation equipment functioned as designed.  Investigations later revealed 
that the cause of the leakage was the formation of two cracks in the neighborhood of a weld 
joint.  The character of the cracks was indicative of a multi-cycle fatigue failure.  It was 
determined that the root cause of the cracks was a closed valve not being fully tightened, 
resulting in a mixing of cold (130 °C) and hot (270 °C) sodium (Buksah 1997). 
 
No site area or offsite contamination was registered due to this event, and there was no 
overexposure to plant personnel.  The event was therefore classified as an anomaly (Level 1 on 
the International Nuclear Event Scale).  After repair and clean-up and completion of a scheduled 
refueling, the reactor was returned to operation on October 24, 1993.  Despite the negligible 
radiological consequences of this event, it was concluded that the next BN-type reactors should 
either keep all components inside of a reactor vessel or use completely jacketed pipes in order to 
have leak-tight protective barriers. 
 
2.3 Almeria Solar Plant 
 
 The Almeria solar plant accident occurred in August 1986 in the Central Receiver System 
(CRS) of the Small Solar Power Systems (SSPS) test facility near Almeria, Spain (Luster 1996).  
The goal of the CRS was to demonstrate the feasibility of electrical power generation by the 
conversion of direct solar radiation into thermal energy and then into electrical power.  Sodium 
was used as a means to store and transport heat to power conversion components of the plant.  
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 Prior to the accident, the plant had been shut down to repair a leaking sodium valve.  The 
valve was to be repaired under a gas pressure of 5.1 bar.  During repair, an auxiliary helicoflex 
seal was used to maintain leak tightness.  When the seal weld was cut about 2/3 of the way 
through, the helicoflex gave way.  After several gulps of gas were expulsed, a strong sodium jet 
was ejected from the damaged valve, creating a violent sodium spray fire (Luster 1996). 
 
 Several personnel were injured during the initial release, but they managed to escape the 
room.  Within a few minutes, operators attempted to release pressure from the system.  However, 
the system was not energized.  By the time emergency power was activated, enough damage had 
been done that the sodium jet could not be stopped by active measures.  After approximately 30 
minutes, the sodium spray damaged a nearby sodium storage vessel, relieving the system 
pressure and terminating sodium expulsion.  The fire was extinguished within two hours. 
 
 Subsequent analysis of the fire region revealed surrounding materials reached 
temperatures as high as 1450°C, causing deformation and ruptures of steel piping and support 
structure, and melting of aluminum valve drive components (Luster 1996).  Fire propagation was 
also investigated.  Due to the nature of sodium fires (short flames, strong aerosol production), the 
propagation of the fire was limited to natural convection.  This resulted in the destruction of 10 
m2 of roof.  The fire door to a neighboring computer room was left open, and hot convective 
gasses caused fire to spread into this area as well.  All other fire doors were closed, preventing 
further spread of the fire. 
 
2.4 ILONA Test Facility 
 
ILONA was a large sodium test facility to investigate natural convection in decay heat 
removal loops and was located at Bensberg, Germany (Luster 1996).  The facility consists of a 
tower-shaped building of steel framework construction on a concrete basement.  A sodium fire 
and a severe sodium-concrete interaction occurred in September 1992 at an auxiliary installation 
in the basement of the ILONA site. 
 
At the time of the accident, storage vessels in the facility basement were being used to 
accept sodium from another plant at the site.  The storage system consisted of two tanks with 
argon supply systems to supply pressure regulation and monitoring.  The sodium to be 
transferred was originally frozen and so was melted with electrical heaters.  Six hours into the 
heating procedure, a failure in the pressure regulation valves caused the control gas to become 
unavailable.  The increasing gas pressure partially opened a gland plug, causing a slow (~0.2 
kg/s) leak of sodium (Luster 1996). 
 
Sodium continued to leak from the vessel for five hours, ultimately releasing 4300 kg.  
Spilled sodium came in contact with the concrete floor and walls, initiating a sodium-concrete 
reaction.  The concrete floor was lifted by reaction products and the thermal expansion of the 
reinforcing steel.  This expansion also lifted one end of the leaking vessel, ultimately inclining 
the vessel to the point of uncovering the opening and stopping the leak.  The fire and concrete 
reaction continued for another nine hours after the leak was stopped. 
 
 Subsequent investigation revealed much about the sodium-concrete interaction and the 
thermal impact of hot reaction gas on unprotected concrete (Luster 1996).  Sodium attacked the 
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concrete to a depth of 39 cm.  Maximum concrete temperatures of 900 °C were found.  The 
reaction produced hydrogen, which burned and further increased the temperature of the storage 
vessel. The reaction products also increased the concrete volume.  Figures of the cross sectional 
and horizontal extent of the sodium-concrete interaction zone can be found in Luster (Luster 
1996).  Thermal effects from the hot reaction gas also destroyed 50 m2 of concrete wall, but did 
not compromise the structural integrity of the building. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
 Accident scenarios of past sodium fires at nuclear reactors and other sodium facilities are 
described in this chapter.  The incidents were chosen to highlight the most significant issues 
surrounding sodium fires.  The four sodium fires are compared in Table 2.  The Monju reactor 
experienced a sodium leak resulting from a design defect during startup.  The design was 
improved and new measures were adopted to better prevent and react to future sodium leaks.  
The BN-600 reactor experienced numerous sodium fires, primarily due to pipe and weld 
cracking.  These primarily occurred in the initial years of reactor operation.  The Almeria solar 
facility experienced a large sodium spray fire caused during a routine maintenance event.  The 
ILONA facility experienced a sodium leak that resulted in significant sodium-concrete 
interactions.  Each of these incidents demonstrates accident scenarios that must be accounted for 
when designing the next generation of sodium-cooled nuclear reactors.   
 
Table 2: Comparison of Sodium Fire Accidents 
 
Sodium Fire Accident Comparison 
Location Fire Type Cause 
 Monju  slow leak  design defect 
 BN-600  leak  weld cracks/fatigue 
 Almeria  spray  maintenance error 
 ILONA  sodium-concrete  valve failure 
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3. NEW REACTOR DESIGNS 
 
This chapter introduces four proposed sodium-cooled reactor designs.  These designs are 
first compared in Section 3.1 in terms of general operating characteristics, such as fuel type and 
efficiency.  Section 3.2 then investigates potential causes of sodium leaks and fires in these new 
reactors during startup, operation, and maintenance.  Finally, potential consequences of sodium 
leaks and fires are discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
3.1 New Sodium Reactor Designs 
 
 Of all the new reactor designs proposed in the Generation IV program, sodium fast 
reactors have the largest experience base.  A summary of existing sodium (and sodium-
potassium) cooled reactors is provided in Table 3 (Berte 2007).  Designers of the new class of 
sodium fast reactors, some of which are described below, have benefited greatly from the wealth 
of information acquired during the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the existing 
fleet.   
 
Table 3: Summary of Sodium-Cooled Reactors Worldwide.  Adapted from (Berte 2007). 
 
Name Purpose Country Coolant Cirucit Type
Power 
(MWth)
Coolant Operation Period
Status     
(Dec. 2005)
RAPSODIE R&D France Loop 40 Na  1967-1983 SE
KNK II R&D Germany Loop 58 Na  1972-1991 DIP
DFR R&D UK Loop 60 NaK  1959-1997 DIP
EBR I R&D USA Loop 1.4 NaK  1951-1963 D
SEFOR R&D USA Loop 20 Na  1969-1972 SE
EBR II R&D USA Pool 62 Na  1961-1994 SE
FERMI 1 R&D USA Loop 300 Na  1963-1972 DIP
FFTF R&D USA Loop 400 Na  1980-1992 SD
JOYO R&D Japan Loop 140 Na  1977-2002 SD
BR-5/10* R&D Russian F. Loop 10 Na  1959-2002 SD
SRE R&D USA Loop 20 Na  1957-1964 D
HALLAM R&D USA Loop 254 Na  1963-1964 D
BOR-60 R&D Russian F. Loop 60 Na  1968- OP
FBTR R&D India Loop 40 Na  1985- OP
PHENIX Prototype France Pool 563 Na  1973- OP
PFR Prototype UK Pool 670 Na  1974-1994 DIP
BN-350 Prototype Kazakhstan Loop 1000 NaK  1972-1999 DIP
MONJU Prototype Japan Loop 714 Na  1995- OP
S. PHENIX Commerc. France Pool 3000 Na  1985-1998 DIP
BN-600 Commerc. Russian F. Pool 1470 Na 1980- OP
*  The BR-5 was upgraded in 1964; thereafter it was referred to as the BR-10.                                             ** 
OP-in operation; SD-shut down; SE-safe enclosure; DIP-decom. in progress; D-decommissioned  
 
 The next generation of sodium-cooled fast reactors discussed in this chapter use one of 
two design types: pool-type and loop-type.  In loop-type reactors, the primary coolant circulates 
through primary heat exchangers external to the reactor pressure vessel.   Pool-type reactors, in 
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contrast, have the primary heat exchangers (and in some cases the primary pumps) immersed in 
sodium inside the reactor pressure vessel.   
 
 Four reactor designs chosen based on availability of information are highlighted in this 
section.  They are the Japan Sodium Fast Reactor (JSFR) by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA), the Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) by Idaho National Lab (INL), the Super Safe, 
Small, and Simple (4S) reactor by Toshiba, and the Advanced Breeder Test Reactor (ABTR) by 
Argonne National Lab (ANL).  A top-level comparison of these reactors is provided in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Comparison of Advanced Concept Sodium-Cooled Reactors 
 
Advanced Concept Sodium-Cooled Reactors 
Reactor JSFR SFR 4S ABTR 
Developer JAEA INL Toshiba ANL 
Flow Type Loop Pool Pool Pool 
Power Output (MWe) 1500 varies 50 95 
Plant Efficiency ~42% ~40% 37% 38% 
Fuel Type oxide tbd metal metal 
Max Sodium Temp (°C) 550 510-550 510 510 
 
 
3.1.1 Japan Atomic Energy Agency Sodium Fast Reactor  
 
 The JSFR is a sodium-cooled, advanced loop-type reactor evolved from Japanese fast 
reactor technologies (Ichimiya 2007).  It is a 1500 MWe design with an estimated 42 percent 
plant efficiency. The JSFR design uses a trans-uranic, mixed oxide (TRU-MOX) fuel with a fast 
spectrum flux to achieve breakeven burn-up.  A summary of plant specifications is provided in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: JFSR Design Parameters. Adapted from (Ichimiya 2007) 
 
JFSR Design Parameters 
Reactor Parameters Reference Value 
Electricity output 1,500MWe 
Plant efficiency Approx. 42% 
Reactor Vessel Loop 
Primary sodium Temperature 395 ºC / 550 ºC  
Power Conversion Rankine 
Fuel Type TRU-MOX 
Cladding Material 
ODS (oxide dispersion 
strengthened) ferritic steels  
Burn-up ~150 GWd/t 
Conversion ratio Break even (1.03), 1.1 
Cycle length 26 months, 4 batches 
 
 According to the plant designers, three primary areas are being improved upon with this 
design.  The first is the reduction of construction cost.  This will be achieved by the adoption of 
innovative technologies, such as those being implemented in current Japanese construction, and 
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through R&D efforts on several issues now in progress.  The second is an improvement in core 
performance characteristics such as the breeding capability, actinide burning characteristics, fuel 
burn-up, and operation cycle length.  The third target area of improvement, and the most relevant 
to this paper, is sodium safety.  The potential drawbacks of sodium are to be overcome by system 
design features such as double-walled sodium boundaries in piping and heat exchangers. Thus, 
the designers conclude that plant safety and reliability can be ensured.   
 
3.1.2 Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor  
 
The SFR system, developed for the Generation IV program, features a fast-spectrum, 
sodium-cooled pool-type reactor (Lineberry 2002).  The fuel cycle employs a full actinide 
recycle with two major options.  One option is an intermediate size (150 to 500 MWe) sodium-
cooled reactor with uranium-TRU-zirconium metal alloy fuel. The second option is a medium to 
large (500 to 1,500 MWe) sodium-cooled reactor with MOX fuel. The sodium outlet temperature 
is approximately 550 °C for both options.  A summary of reactor parameters is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: SFR design parameters.  Adapted from (Lineberry 2002) 
 
SFR Design Parameters 
Reactor Parameters  Reference Value 
Rating (MWth)  varies 
Plant Efficiency Approx 40% 
Reactor Vessel Pool 
Primary Sodium Outlet Temp  510 ºC – 550 ºC 
Power Conversion Rankine 
Fuel Type Oxide or metal alloy 
Cladding Material Ferritic or ODS ferritic 
Burn-up  ~150-200 GWd/t 
Conversion Ratio  0.5-1.30 
Cycle Length varies 
 
 
The SFR is designed for management of high-level wastes and, in particular, 
management of plutonium and other actinides. Important safety features of the system include a 
long thermal response time, a large margin to coolant (sodium) boiling, a pool-type primary 
system that operates near atmospheric pressure, and an intermediate sodium system between the 
radioactive sodium in the primary system and the water and steam in the power plant.  The SFR's 
fast spectrum also makes it possible to use available fissile and fertile materials (including 
depleted uranium) considerably more efficiently than thermal spectrum reactors with once-
through fuel cycles.  
 
3.1.3 Toshiba Super Safe, Small, and Simple 
 
The Toshiba 4S reactor is a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled pool-type reactor (Sakashita 
2004).  Designs with power outputs ranging from 10 to 50 MWe have been proposed.  A 
moderate 33 percent efficiency is achieved with core outlet sodium temperatures of 510 °C.  A 
summary of reactor parameters is shown in Table 7.  The 4S reactor is intended for use in remote 
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locations and to operate without refueling during its 30-year life.   This is achieved in part with a 
metal fuel enrichment of 19.9 percent, just below the 20 percent definition of highly enriched 
uranium.  The 4S has been compared with a nuclear “battery” because it does not require 
refueling.  The lack of refueling would mean that the reactor’s fuel supply would be a capital 
cost rather than an operating cost.   
 
Table 7: 4S Design Parameters.  Adapted from (Sakashita 2004) 
 
4S Design Parameters 
Reactor Parameters Reference Value 
Electricity Output 50 MWe 
Plant Efficiency 37% 
Reactor Vessel Pool 
Primary Sodium Temp 355 ºC / 510 ºC 
Power Conversion Rankine 
Fuel Type U-Zr metal 
Cladding Material Advanced ferritic steel 
Burn-up 34 GWd/t 
Conversion Ratio 0.45 
Cycle Length 30 years 
 
3.1.4 Advanced Breeder Test Reactor 
 
The ABTR is a sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor based on experience gained from the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (Chang 2006).  It is a 95 MWe design with an estimated 38 
percent plant efficiency.  The ABTR was developed as a test bed for a similar commercial 
design-the Advanced Breeder Reactor.  The ABTR design uses a 20 percent TRU, 80 percent 
uranium metal fuel clad with HT-9 stainless steel.  A summary of plant specifications is provided 
in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: ABTR Design Parameters.  Adapted from (Chang 2006) 
 
ABTR Design Parameters 
Reactor Parameters Reference Value 
Electricity Output 95 MWe 
Plant Efficiency  38% 
Reactor Vessel Pool 
Primary Sodium Temp 355 ºC / 510 ºC 
Power Conversion Supercritical CO2 Brayton 
Fuel Type metal ( ~20% TRU, 80% U) 
Cladding and Duct Material  Advanced ferritic steel 
Burn-up ~115 GWd/t 
Conversion Ratio ~0.6 
Cycle Length  4 months 
 
 
 There are numerous objectives of the ABTR design, including demonstration of reactor-
based transmutation of trans-uranics as part of an advanced fuel cycle, qualification of the trans-
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uranic-containing fuels and advanced structural materials needed for a full-scale ABR, and 
supporting the research, development and demonstration required for certification of an ABR 
standard design by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  ABTR designers also have the 
following objectives: 
• To incorporate and demonstrate innovative design concepts and features that may lead to 
significant improvements in cost, safety, efficiency, reliability, or other favorable 
characteristics that could promote public acceptance and future private sector investment in 
advanced breeder reactors; 
• To demonstrate improved technologies for safeguards and security; 
• To support development of the U.S. infrastructure for design, fabrication and construction, 
testing and deployment of systems, structures and components for the ABR. 
 
3.2 Potential Causes of Sodium Leaks 
 
Numerous engineered safety features and safety procedures have been built into the next 
generation of sodium-cooled reactors to reduce the likelihood and consequence of sodium release 
and fire.    These features are extensions of the fire “defense in depth” concepts built into the 
current generation of nuclear reactors.  These fire defenses include (Nowlen 2001): 
• administrative programs (to reduce the likelihood and potential severity of fires) 
• detection and suppression systems and programs (to rapidly extinguish any fires that 
might occur) 
• separation of safe shutdown equipment trains (to reduce the potential effects of a fire on 
key plant systems) and 
• operating procedures and training (to deal with potential fire-induced losses) 
  
 The use of these defenses has led to an excellent record of fire safety at nuclear power 
plants, particularly in the United States.  To date, there have been no fire-induced core damage 
accidents in the history of commercial nuclear power.  However, the unique challenges 
associated with sodium-cooled reactors may increase the risk of fire at these plants.  These risks 
primarily exist during three stages of a reactor’s lifetime; startup, day-to-day operation, and 
refueling and maintenance.  As the nature of the risks varies at each stage, they will be examined 
individually. 
 
3.2.1 Reactor Startup 
 
 Reactor startup is often the most risky time at a  NPP, particularly when the startup is of a 
new reactor design.  Great care is taken to start a new reactor in a systematic fashion.  The core is 
loaded and tested at zero power.  Primary and secondary flow systems are tested at zero power.  
Finally, the full system is operated at increasing power levels to ensure it is working properly.  A 
component may not have been tested at 100% operating conditions until these first full-power 
tests at startup. If a design flaw is present, such as in the Monju example described above, then 
sodium release may occur.   
 
Even if a component has been properly designed, manufacturing defects could result in 
sodium leaks (the so-called “infant mortality” failures).  Welds, particularly welds of dissimilar 
metals, represent a potential failure point at startup, and great care is taken to ensure their 
integrity prior to operation.  A poor weld caused a leak on a newly-installed cold trap on the 
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primary circuit of the Russian BR-5/10 reactor (Poplavsky 2004).  A micro-crack formed in the 
weld after the component was heated by sodium.  A design defect of a valve in the same reactor 
caused the valve to lose its integrity when the sodium experienced thermal expansion during 
startup (Poplavsky 2004).  Design defects can also lead to flow blockages within piping or the 
core region. 
 
As the reactor is operated, the sodium in the primary system will become radioactive.  
Sodium-24 (t1/2=15 hours) is generated from naturally-occurring sodium-23 capturing neutrons 
in the core region.  The level of radiation in the sodium will approach a constant level after a few 
days of operation.  This induced radioactivity introduces additional complications with released 
sodium.  The location of a primary loop sodium leak may be difficult or impossible for personnel 
to reach due to the high levels of radiation present.  If sodium burns, large quantities of oxide 
aerosols are released.  Radioactive sodium in these emissions poses a significant health hazard to 
plant workers and fire-fighting personnel.  In addition, if the sodium vapor is released to the 
environment, it could represent a health threat to the general public.  Perhaps more importantly, 
it will certainly create a public outcry and could prevent the restart of the reactor.  It is for these 
reasons that additional care is taken to prevent primary loop sodium leaks.  Pool-type reactors are 
favored by some designers in part because of the reduced amount of exposed primary piping and 
for their generally lower primary system pressures.  Those pipes that are exposed are jacketed 
with secondary piping and inert atmospheres. 
 
3.2.2 Reactor Operation 
 
 The most severe consequences of sodium release occur during reactor operation.  Great 
care must be taken to minimize risk of component failure during operation.  The potential causes 
for sodium leaks detailed in this paper include heat exchanger, pipeline, valve, reactor vessel, 
and pump failure.  Two potential initiators of failure are also examined: corrosion and external 
events.  The final source identified in past experience is human error.  This particular factor is 
addressed below in the context of the other potential failure initiators as appropriate.  
 
Heat exchangers 
 
 Heat exchangers and steam generators are perhaps the most vulnerable components in a 
sodium-cooled reactor design.  They are composed of thin-walled sodium boundaries, and, in the 
case of steam generators, these boundaries separate sodium from water.  Heat exchanger 
boundary failures may be caused by material failures or by an overpressure caused by a large-
scale sodium-water reaction (King 1991).  It is important to detect small leaks before these large-
scale reactions are able to occur.  It is also critical to be able to rapidly evacuate sodium and/or 
water to prevent a small leak from initiating a larger one.  Since the heat exchangers are the 
primary method used to remove heat from the core, it is important to have redundancy built into 
the heat exchanger design.  If one heat exchanger experiences a leak and must be taken offline, 
the remaining heat exchangers must be able to handle the reactor decay heat. 
 
 An approach being implemented in many new designs is the use of double-walled tubes 
in steam generators (Ichimiya 2007).  The use of an inner and outer tube in the steam generator 
design decreases the chance of sodium-water interaction.  Periodic non-intrusive inspections of 
both tubes are needed minimize the chance of simultaneous failure.  While the use of two tubes 
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will decrease the heat transfer efficiency, this effect is minimized by keeping the inner and outer 
tubes in physical contact. 
 
Pipelines/Valves 
 
 Pipelines and valves are also relatively vulnerable components in a sodium coolant 
system.  Although these components often have redundant design features and secondary jackets, 
particularly in the primary loop, leaks can occur.  In fact, the decades of operating experience at 
Russian reactors have shown pipelines and valves to be the main causes of sodium leaks (Buksah 
1997).  Pipeline leaks are often due to weld failures and issues associated with temperature 
gradients or cyclic thermal loading.  The leaks of the BN-600 and BR-5/10 reactors described 
above are typical of these types of failures.  Small leaks also occurred during the operation of the 
Russian BR-5/10 reactor in two valves, one due to the failure of a sealing bellows.  In this case, 
sodium leakage was confined to within the guard gland sealing.  Another leak occurred due to a 
design defect on a newly installed valve, as described above.  New reactor designs are aiming to 
eliminate the threat of pipe leaks, although their ability to truly eliminate pipe leaks might be 
questioned.  The JFSR design includes guard piping around all primary and secondary sodium 
pipes (Ichimiya 2007).  Additionally, the space between the sodium piping and the guard pipes is 
filled with an inert nitrogen environment to prevent sodium combustion. 
 
Another factor that is to be considered relative to sodium piping is the need to prevent 
sodium-concrete interactions in the event of a leak.  As noted earlier, sodium will react violently 
if it comes into contact with concrete.  In the case of Monju, for example, the walls and floor of 
the facility are lined with stainless steel in areas of sodium piping in order to prevent direct 
sodium to concrete interactions in the event of a leak. One factor that might need to be 
considered in this regard is the height to which the lining is installed and the potential that a 
pressurized piping leak might create a spray fire exposing wall or ceiling surfaces that might not 
be lined.  The potential for such a scenario would be dependent on the extent of concrete lining 
employed and system pressures. 
 
 
Reactor Vessel 
 
 A failure of the reactor vessel is considered an unlikely cause of sodium leakage (King 
1991).  The main reason is that many new reactors use pool-type designs, which rely heavily on 
the reactor vessel for primary coolant containment and which generally operate at low to near-
atmospheric pressures. However, there is some possibility that the reactor vessel will leak.  Two 
concepts are employed in all new reactor designs to mitigate the consequences of sodium leaks.  
The first is the principle of “leak before break” (LBB).  Sodium-cooled reactors generally utilize 
the following features which facilitate the LBB concept (Kubo 1996): 
• Low pressure in primary coolant loop to lessen stress on pressure boundary, 
• Use of ductile materials to reduce likelihood of brittle failures, and 
• Detection of small sodium leaks 
 
 The completion of the third feature—detection of a small sodium leak prior to it 
becoming large enough to release significant amounts of sodium—is vitally important to the 
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success of the LBB concept.  All new reactor designs employ sodium detection to minimize 
potential leaks.  Gas sampling-type leak detectors have also been installed in existing facilities 
(Kubo 1996).   
 
 A second concept used to limit the impact of a large reactor vessel failure is the presence 
of a guard vessel.  This vessel acts to catch sodium in the event of a large reactor vessel failure.  
Guard vessels are employed in the 4S and ABTR designs.  In addition to preventing massive 
amounts of sodium from being released into the containment building (and likely causing a 
serious fire), the guard vessel prevents sodium from getting lower than the level of the core.  
Maintaining sodium coolant cover over the core is vital in order to prevent meltdown due to 
decay heat.  The guard vessel would also keep leaking sodium from coming into contact with the 
concrete surfaces of the primary containment building. 
 
Sodium Pumps 
 
 A sodium pump failure can have serious consequences for the operation of a nuclear 
reactor.  This includes the potential for a direct or indirect sodium leak, which can lead to a 
sodium fire.  Pump seizures (the rapid stoppage of a pump), such as those experienced in the 
sodium reactor at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), could result in pressure 
or temperature transients leading to a sodium leak (Suresh Kumar 2004).  A primary sodium 
pump in the BOR-60 reactor was replaced due to high vibration (Poplavsky 2004).  Studies 
revealed deformation of the pump shaft.  Such conditions could result in a violent failure of a 
pump, which would generate shrapnel and potentially damage other components.  
Electromagnetic pumps being investigated for many new reactor designs, which contain no 
moving parts, would eliminate this threat.  However, this technology is relatively new, and may 
cause different problems.  For example, traditional pumps provide added safety by slowing 
spinning down when they lose power.  Electromagnetic pumps shut down almost immediately 
when power is lost. 
 
Other Event Root Causes 
  
 A common cause of leaks in water reactors is corrosion.  Since the consequences of 
sodium leaks are greater than water leaks, it is important to understand the effects of sodium 
corrosion on cladding and boundary elements.  Sodium has been found to be compatible with 
typical fast reactor structural materials in numerous studies, so long as the sodium is kept free of 
impurities. Other research has extended the sodium-steel corrosion database out to 100,000 hours 
with positive results (Yoshida 1995).  Studies in the BR-5/10 reactor also showed no significant 
corrosion of material after 40 years of operation with purified sodium coolant (Poplavsky 2004).  
Similar experience was also seen with the EBR-II reactor in Idaho (King 1999).  Based on these 
results, the use of cold traps to remove oxygen and other impurities from the sodium is vital to 
the long-term performance of the plant. 
 
 External events, such as earthquakes, represent a serious threat in their ability to cause 
sodium leaks in many of the systems described above.  Although most new reactors incorporate 
seismic isolators into their design, a violent earthquake can still cause severe damage.  Of 
particular importance is the susceptibility of redundant systems to the same external event.  For 
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example, if an external event is disruptive enough to shear a pipe in containment, it will likely 
also rupture the jacketing around the pipe.  In this case, the engineered safety systems will need 
to control the potential fire and maintain core cooling. The potential risk significance of seismic-
induced fires for light water reactors has generally been judged to be low (Nowlen, Najafi, et al. 
2005). However, as noted above seismic-induced piping leaks for a light-water reactor would not 
present a fire threat. In contrast, a sodium leak resulting from a seismic event would likely result 
in a fire. Hence, a re-examination of the potential risk significance of seismic-induced fires for 
metal cooled reactors would be appropriate. 
 
 
3.2.3 Refueling/Maintenance 
 
 Due to their infrequent and hectic nature, refueling and maintenance outages can be a 
particularly challenging time for sodium fire safety.  The complex nature of the refueling 
procedure coupled with the inability to see through the sodium coolant also creates unique 
challenges. For example, the refueling process must take fuel rods from the sodium environment 
with the reactor core, process them through a cleaning process to remove all of the sodium 
coolant, and ultimately transfer the fuel to a non-inert environment for further handling or 
processing. One step in such cleaning processes typically involves washing with kerosene. If a 
sodium fire were to occur during the refueling process, the consequences could be significant. A 
typical fuel handling system in a sodium fast reactor consists of one or more rotating plugs that 
provide fuel handling machines access to all fuel assemblies.  This type of fuel handling system 
has led to problems in several reactors. 
  
 The BN-600 reactor has had two incidents where faults with the rotating plug system 
caused damage to the components being loaded into the core (Buksha 1997).  Both incidents 
occurred due to failure of the plug rotation control system, coupled with operator error.  A 
seizure of a rotating plug in the BN-600 reactor was found to have resulted from 15 kg of sodium 
leaking into the bearing unit (Poplavsky 2004).  During an in-pile transfer operation at the India 
FBTR, an incident occurred that caused damage to the fuel handling gripper, a fuel subassembly, 
the guide tube, and several reflector subassemblies (Suresh Kumar 2004).  This incident was 
caused by system deficiencies combined with human error.  Modifications were made to correct 
the deficiencies and operation began after two years of downtime.   
 
 Sodium loop maintenance has directly caused a number of sodium leaks.  The Almeria 
fire described in Section 2.3 was caused by the improper repair of a leaky sodium valve.  A pipe 
was burst in the BN-5/10 reactor due to an improper sodium re-heating sequence (Poplavsky 
2004).  Similar actions led to four leaks at the BN-600 reactor.  Leaks were also caused when 
pipes were drained, cut for a repair procedure, and then erroneously re-supplied with sodium.  
All of these leaks were immediately detected, and corrective actions quickly followed. 
 
 Almost all of the maintenance and refueling incidents described in this section resulted 
from improper (or non-existent) procedures or poor design.  In every case, corrective actions 
were taken to prevent similar incidents from occurring again.  Modern versions of rotating plug 
systems have proven more reliable.  Although many leaks of various causes occurred at reactors 
like the BN-5/10, almost all of them happened during the early stages of the facility operation 
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(Poplavsky 2004).  Learning from the mistakes made in the early days of sodium reactor 
technology has been vital for the design of new reactors. This experience also highlights the 
potential importance of human errors as a root cause for sodium fires. 
 
3.3 Sodium Fire Consequences 
 
 Sodium fires at any facility can cause serious problems beyond the immediate burn area.  
However, a sodium fire at a nuclear reactor can have consequences beyond those possible at non-
nuclear facilities.  This section will address some of the potential consequences of a sodium fire 
at a nuclear power plant, including the impacts of smoke in the control room, core voiding, 
reactor undercooling, loss of heat sink, and loss of engineered safety systems.  
 
3.3.1 Control Room 
 
 During several non-sodium reactor fires, smoke has entered the control room as a result 
of fires elsewhere in the plant. In a few of these cases, the smoke affected the operators’ ability 
to react to the situation (Nowlen 2001).  At Beloyarsk, a fire started in the turbine building and 
propagated into the control building, generating smoke in the control room that was so heavy it 
adversely affected the operators.  Reports from the fire at Calvert Cliffs cite smoke in the main 
control room as one factor that contributed to the operator error, which led to an overcooling 
transient.  During a fire at Narora, smoke rapidly entered the main control room through the 
ventilation system. The operators had to leave the main control room about 10 minutes into the 
accident and were not able to re-enter for about 13 hours.  The location of the control room 
relative to sodium-containing areas, ventilation intake locations, and ventilation strategy will 
need to be carefully considered to prevent such events in the proposed sodium reactors discussed 
earlier in this chapter. 
 
3.3.2 Core Voiding 
 
 A fundamental difference between water and sodium-cooled reactors is the void 
reactivity coefficient.  If the water around the core is voided (boiled, drained) in a water-cooled 
(thermal) reactor during operation, the power level will automatically drop.  The reactor is 
therefore said to have a negative void reactivity coefficient.  In contrast, if sodium is voided in 
certain sodium-cooled fast reactors (particularly large reactors), it will cause the power level of 
the reactor to rapidly increase.  This reactor is said to have a positive void reactivity coefficient.  
When the reactor power increases, it can lead to additional boiling and voiding until fuel melts.  
This positive feedback can lead to extremely rapid surges in reactor power, potentially damaging 
or melting fuel and cladding. 
 
 Multiple events can lead to core voiding during operation, and great care is taken in the 
proposed new reactors to ensure that these events are prevented.  They include sodium boiling, 
loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), and gas bubble entrainment within the sodium.  Sodium fires 
could lead to sodium boiling if an undercooling event is initiated without scram (reactor 
shutdown).  A severe leak in the secondary system, perhaps coupled with cable fires could lead 
to this situation.  A large leak in the primary system could also disrupt flow enough to induce 
sodium boiling in the core.  A sodium leak in the primary system could also lead to either a 
LOCA or gas bubble entrainment event.  A large primary leak could potentially uncover a 
26 
portion of the core.  If gas is pulled back into a leak in the primary system, the resulting bubbles 
could also reach the core.   
 
3.3.3 Loss of Heat Sink 
 
 A loss of heat sink event can be triggered by sodium leaks in the steam generators.  As 
stated above, the standard procedure in response to these leaks is to drain one or both sides of the 
steam generator.  In the event that multiple steam generators are compromised, reactor cooling 
must be accomplished with backup safety systems.  In the case of the new generation of reactors, 
these safety systems are generally passive in nature (i.e. they require no operator intervention).  
These systems ultimately rely on natural circulation driven by core decay heat, and so are also 
independent of cable fires or loss of site power.  In addition to these engineered safety features, 
the inherent high heat capacity of the sodium and structural elements of the reactor will provide 
valuable time for operators to restore the system to normal. 
 
3.3.4 Loss of Engineered Safety Systems 
 
 The inherent mobility of a fire can cause a fire to become a threat to an entire reactor 
system. Numerous examples exist of cable fires causing serious problems in a nuclear power 
plant.  Perhaps the most famous of these is the 1975 Browns Ferry fire, where all of the normal 
core-cooling functions were lost due to a cable fire (Nowlen 2001).  However, operators were 
able to maintain core cooling with a control rod drive pump not included in plant procedures.  
The fire at Greifswald burned for about 92 minutes causing a station blackout and the loss of all 
active means of cooling the core (Nowlen 2001). As a result, a pressurizer relief valve opened 
and failed to close. This situation persisted for at least five hours and led to depletion of the 
secondary and primary side coolant inventories. The plant was ultimately recovered through 
initiation of low pressure pumps, the recovery of off-site power, and the recovery of one 
auxiliary feedwater pump. 
 
 These and other incidents demonstrate the need for next-generation sodium-cooled 
reactors to consider the potential impact of fire on safety systems to maintain core cooling, 
including the passive safety systems.  Every adverse situation cannot be anticipated or avoided.  
However, if the reactor safety systems operate independent of the plant operators and electrical 
systems, then these systems can likely maintain cooling until plant personnel put out fires and 
regain control of the situation. 
 
There is one additional factor that is unique to metal fires that may need to be addressed. 
Conventional (i.e., non-metal) fires are not generally considered a threat to primary plant piping 
components used in a light-water reactor (Nowlen, Najafi, et al. 2005). This would include the 
primary piping itself and other piping equipment such as large valves, check valves, and water-
filled vessels (e.g., storage tanks). However, sodium fires burn at much higher temperatures than 
do other types of fires.  Hence, metal fires could represent a threat to components and equipment 
not normally considered fire-vulnerable. For metal-cooled reactors, the performance of plant 
safety systems and equipment under fire conditions, including the passive safety systems, should 
be evaluated in this context. 
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3.4 Summary 
  
 Of all the new reactor designs proposed in the Generation IV program, sodium fast 
reactors have the largest experience base.  Thanks in large part to this experience, numerous 
engineered safety features and safety procedures have been built into the next generation of 
sodium-cooled reactors.  These features are designed to reduce the likelihood and consequence 
of sodium release and fire.   
 
 The risk of sodium release and fire exist during the three stages of a reactor lifetime; 
startup, day-to-day operation, and refueling and maintenance. Based on past experience, design 
and manufacturing defects have generated the greatest risk of sodium leakage and fire at reactor 
startup.  Pipes, welds, and steam generator tubes are the most likely components to fail during 
routine operation.  Thermal and mechanical fatigue must be avoided to minimize the chance of 
these failures. Refueling and maintenance accidents are generally caused by a combination of 
improper procedures and human error.  The experience gained in existing reactors should help to 
minimize the chance of these leaks.   
 
 Sodium fires at any facility can cause serious problems beyond the immediate burn area.  
However, a sodium fire at a nuclear reactor can have consequences beyond those possible at non-
nuclear facilities. The most notable consequences of sodium fire at a nuclear power plant include 
smoke in the control room, core voiding, reactor under-cooling, loss of heat sink, and loss of 
engineered safety systems. Sodium fires burn much hotter than other types of fires and might 
therefore threaten plant equipment, such as piping elements that are not normally considered 
vulnerable to fire damage. Utilizing past experience to develop suitable safety systems and 
procedures will minimize the chance of sodium leaks and the associated consequences in the 
next generation of sodium-cooled reactors.  However, some unique considerations do come into 
play with sodium fires. 
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4. SODIUM COMBUSTION AND BURNING CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Early research done by Newman in 1972 introduces the topic of liquid metal hazards in 
normal atmospheres of oxygen and water.  One of the main findings through the literature is the 
significant work done on how metals ignite and burn. However, there has not been as much done 
on the chemical reaction taking place in the flame zone.  To start with the overall sodium 
combustion and burning characteristics, below in Table 9 are some values of ignition 
temperatures that Newman reports in his work.  There is a large range of ignition temperatures 
for sodium presented here; this could be caused by different definitions of what “ignition 
temperature” means.  In fact, the concept of an ignition temperature is a misleading one since the 
critical condition is properly characterized with a Damkohler number, the ratio of the rate of heat 
release to the rate of thermal dissipation (or some similar definition).  When thermal dissipation 
is fast, any heat released is dissipated and a thermal runaway cannot occur.  Makino (2006) has 
recognized this fact and developed ignition criteria for both droplets and pools that explain at 
least some of the variation in the ignition temperatures.  
 
There are two distinct forms of metal combustion.  One occurs if the metals are less 
volatile than their oxides in which case combustion is limited to the surface.  The second form 
occurs if the oxide is less volatile than the metal in which case the flame temperature can reach a 
level where the vapor pressure will move the reaction zone off the metal surface.  The boiling 
point of sodium is 1153 K and the principal oxide is Na2O with a boiling temperature of 2223 K 
so the vapour phase mechanism is expected for sodium metal burning (Newman, 1972).  
However, in many circumstances heat losses are substantial enough that surface oxidation is 
observed even for sodium; this is particularly true for pool fires (Newman 1972). 
 
Table 9: Sodium Ignition Temperatures Presented by Newman, 1972 
  
Conditions Ignition 
Temperature (K) 
Source 
Droplets, wet and 
dry air 
393 Cowan and Vickers, 1954 
Droplets, dry 
oxygen/nitrogen 
473 Richard et al., 1969 
Spray, dry air 623-698 Krolikowski et al. (a), 1969 
Pool, dry oxygen 482 Lemarchand, 1935 
Pool, dry oxygen 433 Cornec and Sannier, 1967 
Pool, dry oxygen, at 
varying pressures 
488 (1atm) Malet et al., 1970 
Pool, varying oxygen 
and water content 
733-505 Longton, 1957 (a) 
Pool, varying oxygen 
and hydrogen 
content 
543-515 Longston, 1957 (b) 
Pool, atmospheric 
conditions 
unspecified 
473-323 Morewitz et al., 1967 
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There are two distinct mechanisms for metal burning as follows (Newman 1972).  
 
• Vapor phase burning takes place above the metal surface, where the metal atoms 
diffuse outward and the oxygen diffuses inward.  This mechanism limits the flame 
temperature to the boiling point of the oxides produced.   
• Surface burning usually takes place with volatile oxides like zirconium where 
oxygen diffuses to the metal surface and the reaction takes place.   
 
The report written by Newman in 1983 explains the burning process of sodium very well: 
 
“During the flameless combustion there is a rapid surface oxidation process with 
the formation of a grey purple product close to the sodium surface and sodium monoxide 
and sodium peroxide overlaying this layer marked by yellow and white regions.  The 
surface thickness rapidly grows and wrinkles, with oxide nodules or pillars growing in 
random positions.  At pool temperatures in the region of 350-450 °C small flames marked 
by light and smoke emissions appear on the nodules as vapour phase combustion 
commences.  The oxide pillars act as wicks allowing the liquid sodium within them to be 
heated above the temperature of the bulk sodium beneath the wick.  The nodules appear 
to commence at regions of the surface where this is a yellow coloration marking the 
accumulation of sodium peroxide. This surface combustion phase proceeds by oxygen 
diffusing to the metal surface through porous oxides.  The outer oxide layer then becomes 
remote from the metal, and further oxidation to sodium peroxide reactions (ii) occurs.  If 
at a later stage liquid sodium begins to wet the oxide above it and moves upwards by 
capillary action it will react with the peroxide releasing heat by reaction (xi)(Newman 
and Smith, 1973) .” 
 
There is little information about the surface combustion taking place within the sodium 
air flames.  This is because a separation cannot be made between the vapor phase and surface 
reactions occurring simultaneously.  Again, the difficulty associated with the formation of a non-
homogenous surface layer with the oxide wick structure is not well understood (Newman 1983). 
 
4.1 Sodium Aerosol Formation 
 
This chapter explains experimental work done in the Beschreibung der Forschungsanlage 
zur Untersuchung nuklearer Aerosole, (FAUNA) facility in Germany as well as comparative 
computer codes for sodium aerosol formation. The majority of the experimental work presented 
here for sodium aerosol formation was carried out by Cherdron, Jordan, and coworkers.  The 
sodium aerosol research would benefit greatly from more R&D.    
 
4.1.1 Experimental Work 
 
 Sodium oxide and sodium peroxide are the main products when sodium burns in a 
normal atmosphere.  The products that remain airborne are mainly sodium peroxide; the peroxide 
reduces to oxide when it makes contact with the metallic sodium surface.  These oxides react 
with the water vapor in the atmosphere to form sodium hydroxide.  This all depends on the 
diffusion of the water vapor to the oxides.  Quoting from (Cherdron & Jordan 1988): 
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“On the basis of the Fuchs-Sutukin theory the transformation time of 0.1-10 μm sodium 
peroxyde particles to sodium hydroxyde at relative humidities higher than 35% is faster than 1/10 
second (Table 4). At relative humidities higher than 35% the reaction products (NaOH) are 
droplets. At relative humidities lower than 35% the particles are solid.”  
 
The hydroxides then react with the carbon dioxide in the air and form sodium carbonate 
relatively quickly in a normal atmosphere (Cherdron & Jordan 1988).  About 50% of the sodium 
that went airborne is converted to carbonate after only 1 minute. It was shown that after 260 
seconds, with relative humidity greater than 50%, almost all of the airborne sodium was 
converted to sodium carbonate.  In contrast, with relative humidity less than 10%, only 20% of 
the airborne sodium was converted to carbonate (Cherdron & Jordan 1984). This is similar to 
what Cherdron & Jordan mentioned in 1988 where measurements showed that this 
transformation at relative humidities greater than 50% happened faster by a factor of 5 compared 
to relative humidities at about 5% (Cherdron & Jordan 1988).  It was also mentioned that sodium 
hydroxide particles convert faster to sodium carbonate relative to their size; that is, smaller 
particles convert faster than larger particles (Cherdron & Jordan 1984).   
 
At relative humidity less than 20% the aerodynamic mass median diameter for sodium 
fire aerosols in the combustion zone were about 1 μm and for relative humidity greater than 50% 
the aerodynamic mass medium diameter was measured at about 2 μm (Cherdron & Jordan 1984).  
For sodium spray fires, it is hard to specify an aerosol formation rate. If the spray is setup 
properly, 100% aerosol formation can happen. In contrast, a compact spray will have a small 
aerosol release rate.  For almost all the tests, about 30 to 90% of the mass of the sodium was 
converted to aerosol (Cherdron & Jordan 1988).  The remaining oxides are likely carried with the 
spray and deposited on surfaces.  This is a wide range, and the work presented in 1984 by 
Cherdron & Jordan falls in the same range.  Cherdron & Jordan’s work in 1988 presented the 
aerodynamic mass median diameter measured at 1.2 to 1.9 μm.  The particles that were measured 
inside a closed containment experiment were primarily sodium peroxide (Cherdron & Jordan 
1988).   
 
 In 1988, a five-country consortia studied the evaporation process for sodium aerosols in a 
fire. The relationship between the sodium burning rate and the aerosol production rate is 
significantly different depending on the magnitude of the air convective movement.  For 
anything but a sodium pool fire (sodium spray, column, or combined fire), it is suggested that the 
aerosol production rate is equal to the combustion rate. The differences in aerosol formation are 
greatly affected by the relative humidity (Jordan et al. 1988).  The information provided here for 
aerosol formation is brief but emphasizes some important findings specific to sodium.  Most of 
these experiments were relatively small-scale which could pose a problem for large-scale 
extrapolation due to scaling effects.     
 
4.2 Sodium Spray Fires  
 
This section covers the sodium spray fire experimental work as well as some computer 
code development done for sodium spray fires.  
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4.2.1 Experiments 
 
 One of the main groups of large-scale sodium spray fire experiments was performed at 
the FAUNA facility in Germany.  The objective of these experiments was to look at the 
containment pressure rise with a hypothetical core disruptive accident (HCDA) resulting in a 
sodium spray into an oxygen-containing atmosphere.  Overall the total pressure did not go above 
1.8 bars with a spray of 60 kg of sodium that was released in 1.5 seconds (Cherdron &  
Charpenel 1985a).   
 
 The FAUNA test vessel is 6 m in diameter and 6 m tall, having a total volume of 220 m3.  
To summarize the experiments performed, all had 20.8 vol.% of oxygen, the sodium temperature 
was 773 K, and the sodium ejection speed was 20 m/s.  The average pressure rise for all 
experiments was about 0.57 bar/s.  There was a lot of uncertainty with the wall temperatures 
because the thermocouples were simply glued to the surface.  The aerodynamic mass medium 
diameters measured were 1.3 μm and 2.15 μm for the experiments using 7 kg and 20 kg of 
sodium respectively.  For the 40 kg test, the measured diameter was 4.8 μm after 2 minutes.  The 
highest recorded temperature was about 1200 °C (Cherdron & Charpenel 1985a). Table 10 lists 
the experimental conditions for tests FS1 through FS6 done at the FAUNA facility. This table of 
information is taken from Cherdron & Charpnel’s first report in 1985. Table 11 is the summary 
of the initial experimental conditions presented for these experiments. Table 12 is a summary of 
the oxygen consumption for the experiments (Cherdron & Charpenel 1985a).  
 
Table 10: Cherdron & Charpenel, 1985, FAUNA FS1-FS6 Comparison of Experimental 
Conditions 
 
 Reactor HCDA FAUNA Experiment Up Scale 
Volume (m3) 6500 220 1/30 
Flow rate (kg/s) up to 2300 56 1/40 
Ejection time (s) 1 0.12-1.0 1 
Mass ejected (kg) up to 2300 7-60 1/40 
Ejection speed (m/s) 5-40 20 1 
O2 concentration (vol%) 21 21 1 
Sodium temperature (°C) 500-600 500 1 
 
Table 11: Cherdron & Charpenel, 1985, FAUNA FS1-FS6 Initial Experimental Conditions 
 
Experiment Initial 
pressure 
(105 Pa) 
Initial gas 
temperature 
(K) 
Nitrogen 
(% vol) 
Water 
vapor 
(%vol) 
Initial wall 
temperature 
(K) 
Ejection 
time 
(s) 
FS1 0.998 296 77.7 1.6 291 0.12 
FS2 1.008 297 77.1 2.1 286 0.36 
FS3 0.978 272 78.6 1.8 270 0.53 
FS4 1.004 273 78.7 0.5 272 0.53 
FS5 0.977 279 78.8 0.4 279 0.71 
FS6 0.999 287 78.4 0.8 287 1.0 
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Table 12: Cherdron & Charpenel, 1985, FAUNA FS1-FS6 Oxygen Consumption Results 
 
Experiment Oxygen 
concentration 
after 
experiment 
(Vol%) 
Total 
amount 
of gas 
(moles) 
final 
Oxygen 
(moles) 
final 
Oxygen 
consumed 
(moles) 
Sodium 
burnt 
(kg) 
Ratio of 
sodium 
burnt 
/sodium 
ejected 
FS1 20.05 8943 1714 86 3.96 0.56 
FS2 18.3 8773 1623 277 12.74 0.64 
FS3 17.6 8677 1527 373 17.15 0.57 
FS4 17.2 8635 1485 414 19.08 0.64 
FS5 13.4 8256 1106 794 36.5 0.91 
FS6 12.2 8144 994 906 41.7 0.70 
 
 Morewitz et al. presented experiments of single droplet burning as well as spray fires for 
sodium.  The spray fire experiments are discussed here.  These were done in a pressure vessel 
that was modified to handle high temperatures. Morewitz et al. describes the experimental set up 
as: “a regulated argon gas drive pressure system injected liquid sodium into a fog nozzle where 
high pressure oxygen atomized the sodium jet and initiated burning to produce high-temperature, 
high-concentration sodium oxide aerosols.”  Aerosol samples were measured between 100 and 
200 µm in diameter immediately after the spray ended. The impactors collected aerosols that 
were measured having a diameter between 2 and 4 µm at time 30 seconds after the end of the 
spray.  The large aerosol agglomerates fall out which lead to the reduction in aerosol mass.  
Below in Table 13 is a summary of the 8 experiments based on the information taken directly 
from the report (Morewitz et al. 1977).  
 
Table 13: Morewitz et al., 1977, High Temperature-Concentration Aerosol Test Summary 
 
Observation Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Mass of Sodium Injected(g) 36 36 67 136 163 215 199 194 
Sodium Injection Temperature (°C) 540 539 543 545 540 544 547 550 
Injection Time (s) 0.9 0.9 1.6 8.7 8.9 6.8 4.9 5.4 
Maximum Pressure Rise (atm) 0.41 0.41 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.80 1.05 0.98 
Maximum Gas Tempperature Mid-
Vessel (°C) 
463 405 990 1045 1010 950 910 1180
Maximum Gas Temperature-Lower-
Vessel (°C) 
390 20 30 >1200 >1200 210 40 100 
Calculated Initial Aerosol 
Concentration (g/m3) 
110 110 290 560 673 888 822 801 
Maximum Aerosol Concentration 
Measured (g/m3) 
80 - 20 110 270 80 160 80 
First Sample at Time (min) 0.1 - 4 0.1 0.1 1 0.3 1 
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At an International Atomic Energy Agency International Working Group Fast Reactors, 
Specialists’ Meeting, Sodium Fires in 1988, Himeno et al. presented leak tests that were 
performed at the Safety Phenomenology Tests on Sodium Leak, Fire and Aerosols, (SAPFIRE) 
facility in Japan, with 2.4 tons of sodium that was heated to 505 °C with a flow rate of 3.1 kg/s 
for 13 minutes.  The videos and pictures showed that the flow was a downward column pattern 
with no ignition. There were rebound droplets from the floor that ignited. About 4% of the 
sodium burned during the test compared to other spray tests that have shown 30% of the sodium 
burned in the test. There was an examination done after the test and it “revealed no failure of the 
jackets and no burning of the thermal insulator around the pipe” (Himeno et al. 1988). 
  
A prototype mitigation system was mounted in SOLFA-11. For these tests 3 tons of 
sodium was heated to 505 °C then spilled from the pipe for 15 minutes at a rate of 3.2 kg/s.  The 
test lasted for 6.6 hours and the oxygen concentrations were maintained around 21% by feeding 
oxygen into the room or by ventilation. The upper and lower cell aerosol concentration was 
determined at a maximum of 23 g/m3 and 5 g/m3 respectively. The experiments showed that “the 
combustion rate due to the mixed fires (rebound droplets and pool) was from 100 to 130 kW/m2 
of floor liner that is only 1.1 to 1.3 times larger than that of a pool fire (100 kW/m2).” The 
combustion rate in the smothering tank decreased significantly (50 kW/m2 to 5 kW/m2) after tens 
of minutes because of the quick consumption of the oxygen in the tank (Himeno et al. 1988).  
 
Tests were also performed to see how the integrity of the structural concrete would hold-
up during a sodium leak accident.  The tests used gas burners to heat the steel lining.  A 
thermocouple that was at a depth of 500 mm never got above 80 °C during the test.  The steel 
liner was heated to about 500 °C to represent the previous test temperatures.  Steam that was 
released from the heating of the concrete was vented, but the effects of the steam on increasing 
the sodium fire energy released was not taken into account.  There were also tests done to see if 
the aerosol deposition in the pipes would affect the heat exchanger and electrical 
instrumentation.  There were no significant findings that would prove to pose a threat to the 
electrical instrumentation.  There was a relationship found between the heat transfer coefficient 
and the average weight of the aerosols; that is, as the weight increased the heat transfer 
coefficient decreased (Himeno et al. 1988).     
 
 Malet et al. presented a small amount of information about sodium spray experiments. 
There were nine sodium spray fire experiments in a 3.7 m3 vessel that involved sodium at       
550 °C.  The flow rate was varied from 0.4 to 1.5 kg/s, the injection time varied from 1 to 3.5 
seconds, and the amount of sodium used was between 0.4 and 5.25 kg for these experiments.  
There was not much detail in terms of the analysis for these experiments that could be related to 
the conclusion that the “average atmosphere temperature measurements have a large uncertainty 
due to the large temperature gradient inside the vessel”. Because of the large temperature 
gradient, convective movement played a large role in the spray fire combustion phenomena. In 
this vessel sodium has not been shown to “burn more than the molar ratio 3.3 and the maximum 
over-pressure reached is 2.6 bars” (Malet et al. 1981).  
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4.2.2 Model Development 
 
 The second part of the Cherdron and Charpenel study in 1985 compared the computer 
code PULSAR to the FUANA experiments.  PULSAR1 is a “bidimensional code designed to 
calculate the thermodynamic consequences and the release of aerosols from burning sprayed 
sodium in confined atmosphere”.  The code predicts the overall pressure rise well, but the 
burning rate is under predicted. There is a need to imporve the oxygen consumption model in 
order to improve the overall predictive capability.  The PULSAR code’s droplet combustion 
model is “described using the Spalding theory connected to the d2 law for computing the 
variations in the droplet radii” which brings up another limitation with sodium spray combustion 
models (Cherdron & Charpenel 1985b). The limitation here is the exclusion of the radiative heat 
transfer between droplets.  That is, these models do not treat radiative heat exchange between 
droplets which would act to increase combustion rates and completeness. 
 
 Krolikowski presents a mathematical model for pressure driven sodium spray fires based 
on a single (non-interacting) spherical droplet of sodium reacting in air. Krolikowski’s report 
presents the results of pressure driven sodium spray experiments that were performed along with 
a mathematical model that was developed for a single spherical sodium particle.  These 
experiments measured the pressure rise in the closed reaction chamber.  Ten grams of liquid 
sodium between the temperatures of 350 and 425 °C were injected into the chamber.  The 
pressure in which it was driven in through the nozzle ranged from 1000-1500 psig.  The pressure 
rise rates were measured between 25 and 75 atm/sec with measured pressures of 1.6 to 4.1 atm. 
The reaction rate was drastically affected by the size of the spray particle, while the spray 
velocity had a moderate affect.  There was a small effect on the reaction rate with respect to 
oxygen concentrations (Krolikowski 1968).   
 
CONTAIN-LMR is a subcomponent of CONTAIN, a tool that provides integral level 
analysis of potential accidents in nuclear reactors (Murato et al. 1993 and Scholtyssek & Murata 
1993).  CONTAIN-LMR has models to describe sodium pool fires and sodium spray fires.  The 
sodium spray fire capabilities in CONTAIN-LMR are based largely on the NACOM code 
developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory by Tsai (Tsai 1980) and it is further described in 
Scholtyssek & Murata 1993.  The model prescribes a fixed burning rate which ignores any 
droplet heating.   
 
Of primary importance for accident consequences is the formation of aerosols, and 
CONTAIN-LMR has the ability to model both water and sodium aerosols in some situations.  
Murato et al. does indicate that this multi-species condensation is limited to situations where the 
two materials are not simultaneously condensing (1983).  Since water and sodium-related species 
condense at very different temperatures, this is not a tremendous problem, but this author can 
foresee problems if the condensation of radioactive metals/oxides and their interaction with the 
sodium aerosol are of concern.   CONTAIN-LMR also has models to describe the interactions of 
sodium with concrete, including the out-gassing of vapors from concrete.  
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4.2.3 Summary 
 
 The experimental work presented above included reports from Cherdron and Charpenel, 
Morewitz et al., Himeno et al., and Malet et al..  Cherdron and Charpenel’s work discussed the 
experiments done in the FAUNA facility and the objective of those experiments was to evaluate 
the pressure rise in the vessel. The pressure did not go above 1.8 bars and the maximum recorded 
temperature was 1200 °C (Cherdron & Charpenel 1985a).  Morewitz et al. work consisted of 
both single droplet and spray experiments for liquid sodium.  The spray fires were discussed and 
Table 13 shows the results.  The initial sodium temperatures for the experiments were relatively 
the same (539-550 °C), while the injection time and sodium amount varied between experiments.  
There was a noticeable variation in the vessel temperatures and aerosol concentration results 
(Morewitz et al. 1977).  Himeno et al. presented experiments performed in the SAPFIRE facility 
that looked into the breach of the vessel’s steel liner and electrical equipment failure.  These 
were larger test using between 2.4 and 3 tons of liquid sodium (Himeno et al. 1988).   
 
Most of the identified experiments were performed at least 20-25 years ago. Because of 
the age of the tests the boundary and initial conditions were not well specified, and in particular, 
are not sufficiently well defined to support the development of the state-of-the-art computer 
modeling codes.  The data collected from these experiments is very useful when comparing with 
the new experimental data.  Inter-droplet interaction in a spray is very difficult to understand.  
There has been a lot of work done for single droplet combustion, but an unaddressed need for an 
understanding of how droplets interact with each other during the combustion process for spray 
fire phenomenon.  
 
With respect to the work presented on the sodium spray fire computer models, it was 
difficult to completely understand what the models could actually do without access to the user’s 
manuals.  The user’s manuals were difficult to find in the literature, although efforts to obtain 
documentation of these models will continue.  More research into these models is needed to 
benchmark the addition of sodium fire expertise into the current fire modeling codes.   
 
4.3 Sodium Pool Fires 
 
This section covers the sodium pool fire experimental work as well as some code 
development done for sodium spray fires.  
 
4.3.1 Experiments 
 
 Below in Table 14 are the conditions of the FAUNA pool fire experiments that were 
presented by Cherdron and Jordan (1988).  This is the same FAUNA test facility in Germany 
that was described in the sodium spray fire section above.    
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Table 14: Cherdron & Jordan, 1988, Conditions of the FAUNA Pool Fire Experiments 
 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Pool suface (m2) 2 2 12 12 2 5 2 
Amount of sodium (kg) 150 250 500 500 350 350 120 
Oxygen vol.% 19-22 17-25 15-25 18-25 12-21 4-21 2 
Burning pan, heated, 
isolated 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
  
 There were pool fire experiments with up to 500 kg of sodium, 12 m2  pool area, and a 
sodium inlet temperature of 500°C. Cherdron and Jordan identify three phases of pool fires 
described that are “typical for large (e.g. 12 m2 ) pool areas”: 
 
1. Initial: strong heating of the surround gas which led to about 90% of the maximum 
gas temperature.  
2. Middle: constant temperatures where the height depends on both the pool size and the 
volume of the vessel.  
3. End: the hot residuals are cooling down.  
 
The average burning rate for these experiments was between 20 and 40 kgNa/m2h. For other 
fires, the typical burning rate is on average 27 kgNa/m2h.  For test number 7, there was no visible 
reaction but there was a strong aerosol release from the sodium pool which corresponded to 
decreasing temperatures. 
 
 There were also combined fire experiments done in the FAUNA facility.  These were 
used to simulate an accident of a sodium leak inside insulation.  The understanding is that the 
sodium would fill the insulation and then cause the shield to break.  The sodium release would 
not be an overpressure spray release. The release of sodium from the FAUNA facility was 
simulated as follows: 6 m above the burning pan (12 m2 in area) a sodium outlet was installed 
(capable 800 gNa/s of flow ejection), the flow rates varied between experiments (range of 50 up 
to 710 gNa/s), and the maximum amount of released sodium was 810 kg. From these 
experiments it was shown that the temperature of the gas is “directly connected” to the flow rate 
of sodium. “For flow rates up to 300 g/sec the temperatures fall immediately; no influence of a 
sodium pool can be seen.” This means that most of the sodium was consumed while in the air so 
a pool wasn’t formed.  With higher flow rates, a sodium pool forms and at the end of the 
injection of sodium an average gas temperature of 300 °C was maintained. (Cherdron & 
Freudenstien 1988).  
 
Johnson et al. describes some sodium pool fire tests done in the 1960’s.   The 
experimental setup is described as a vessel 10 ft (~3 m) in diameter and 21 ft (6.4 m) in height.  
Oxygen concentrations were measured and from these the burning rate was calculated.  It was 
shown that for the 25 lb (11.3 kg) test about 90% of the sodium in the pool was consumed after 
20 minutes.  Temperature profiles were measured at different radial distances.  The radiant heat 
flux was only measured at one spot 10 ft (~3m) above the pool.  There was a lot of uncertainty 
with this measurement; therefore no radiation correlations were done.  There were also a lot of 
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visual observations using a video camera.  It was noted that this was an initial effort to 
understand some fundamental concepts of sodium pool burning.  These experiments were broken 
into stages as follows (Johnson et al. 1968): 
 
• Test time (-25 seconds): the sodium was released into the spill pan at 950°F (510°C).  
There was some smoke noticed when the sodium came in contact with the pan as well as 
small parts of the sodium had partial ignition.   
• Test time (0 seconds): All 25 lbs (11.3 kg) of sodium in the spill pan and there was still 
small partial burning. 
• Test time (+30 seconds):  Almost the entire sodium surface was burning.  The burning 
rate and the sodium oxide release rate increased significantly during this time.   
• Test time (+60 seconds): The fire was encompassing the entire pool area and the fire was 
more powerful.  The fire was difficult to see, which mean that the oxide production rate 
increased.  The turbulence that was caused by “gas convective currents, had been well 
established during this period”.   
• Test time (+90 seconds):  The fire was in the full burning phase and the density of the 
oxide particles increased enough to have almost the entire fire obscured.   
 
 The pool fire experiments referenced by Malet et al. were done in a vessel at three 
different facilities varying the volume (4, 2, and 400 m3). The boundary conditions are not well 
defined in these experiments.  This is a recurring issue with older experimental data. These 
experiments looked at how the combustion rate was affected by the variations in sodium 
temperature and combustion area.  The initial temperature of the sodium did not show a 
significant affect on the mean combustion rate.  As the combustion area increased, the time 
averaged combustion rate seemed to decrease.  The amount of aerosolized sodium did not exceed 
45% of the total burned mass and 52% of the burned mass is in peroxide form (Malet et al. 
1981).  
 
 It was also observed that the thickness of the pool did not have an affect on the 
combustion rate.  When the thickness “exceeds 26.5 cm, the burned mass depends almost solely 
on the combustion area”. That is, the tests showed that the burn rate was dependent on the 
exposed surface area but not the pool depth. Humidity was shown to inhibit combustion up to a 
relative humidity of 30% at a temperature of 20°C.  This effect slowly disappears above a 
relative humidity of 60%.  At a 12% oxygen molar fraction the surface and vapor phase 
combustion rates will be similar (Malet et al. 1981).   
 
Newman (1982) reports experimental work on small sodium pool fires in different types 
of atmospheres (i.e. by varying the CO2 levels) to see if CO2 had an effect on extinguishment. 
The experiments used pools between 10 and 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm in depth. Table 
15 is a summary of the observed burning rate with respect to the different experiments. These 
experiments showed that extinction can occur with the right amount of inert gas; the 
complication is designing for the right pool size in an accident scenario in order to obtain the 
right concentrations.  These experiments are small scale, so the issue of extrapolating to a much 
larger scale still exists (Newman 1982).     
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Table 15: Newman, 1982, Summary of Results for Sodium Reaction with CO2 
 
Gas Observation 
Burning in air, 
sodium pool at 
450°C followed by: 
 
25% CO2/air Little reduction in burning rate 
50% CO2/air Little reduction in burning rate 
66% CO2/air Extinction after 5 minutes 
75% CO2/air Extinction after 3 minutes 
100% CO2 Extinction after 2.5 minutes 
20% CO2/argon Extinction achieved > 5 minutes 
 
4.3.2 Model Development 
 
The purpose of this section is to give a brief overview of some of the models that were 
developed for sodium pool fires. Ohno talks about the development of the SOLFAS1 code and 
presents some sodium experimental results that were used.  The SOLFAS code is a three-
dimensional code that consists of the fundamental conservation equations.  There are other 
models in the code which include the sodium pool combustion model and heat transfer models.  
The pool combustion model uses a flame sheet model over the entire pool.  The “flame sheet 
combustion is controlled by sodium and oxygen supplies by diffusion from the pool surface and 
turbulent mass transfer from the atmospheric gas, respectively”.  The turbulence model in the 
SOFAS code was validated against the experimental data from Tropea. The SOFAS code has 
“the capability to predict the natural convective heat transfer in the region up to Re=1012” (Ohno 
1990). 
  
Sodium pool fire experiments performed in the FRAT-11 vessel in the SAPFIRE facility 
were referenced in Ohno’s report. These experiments were performed to determine the 
combustion rate of the sodium, which was calculated from the measured oxygen consumption in 
the vessel.  These experiments used 10 kg of sodium that ranged in temperatures between 175 °C 
to 400 °C.  The pool had a depth of 0.2 m of sodium with a cover gas of 3 m3 and a 3% oxygen 
concentration.  The experimental results were compared to the SOFIRE-MII1 code.  The 
combustion rate was impacted by the sodium temperature in the experiments. The computation 
code, however, estimates the combustion rate as a constant.  An overview of some sodium 
column fire experiments were also presented.  These tests showed that there are three main 
factors that affect the columnar combustion rate; the oxygen concentration, the sodium leak flow 
rate, and the collision velocity of sodium leakage.  At the time Ohno’s report was written the 
SOFAS code was still undergoing more development (Ohno 1990). 
 
 The SOFIRE-MII, ASSCOPS1, and SPM1 sodium pool combustion codes are described 
in a paper by Miyake et al. (1991). All three models were validated against large-scale 
experiments that were performed in Japan at the SAPFIRE facility and at Kernforschungzentrum 
Karlsruhe (KfK) in the FAUNA facility.  The SOFIRE-MII and ASSCOPS codes have the 
conventional combustion models in them; that is, where the combustion happens at the pool 
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surface.  The SPM model uses a flame combustion model that is more sophisticated. Miyake et 
al. claim that no other sodium combustion codes have been validated against large-scale 
experiments.  The specifics of these combustion models for the three codes are described in some 
detail.  The results of the validation effort showed that all three codes can predict the overall 
combustion process “reasonably well”. Although SPM has a more sophisticated combustion 
model, this validation effort did not reveal the difference in the overall combustion process 
predictions (Miyake et al. 1991).   
 
CONTAIN-LMR is a subcomponent of CONTAIN, a tool that provides integral level 
analysis of potential accidents in nuclear reactors (Murato et al. 1993 and Scholtyssek & Murata 
1993).  CONTAIN-LMR has models to describe sodium pool fires and sodium spray fires.  The 
sodium pool fire model is taken from SOFIRE II (Beiriger 1973).  The sodium-concrete 
interactions are based upon the SLAM model (Suo-Anttila 1983). 
 
4.3.3 Summary 
 
The experimental work presented above for sodium pool fires was a compilation of the 
research done by Cherdron and Jordan, Johnson et al., Malet et al., and Newman.  These works 
appear to represent a bulk of the early sodium fire experimental research. Cherdron and Jordan 
presented both sodium pool fires and sodium combined fires performed in the FAUNA facility.  
The average burning rate was recorded between 20-40 kgNa/m2h.  One important observation is 
that the pool fire test with an oxygen concentration of 2% volume showed no visible reaction but 
a strong aerosol production was noticed.  Johnson et al. presented sodium pool fire experiments 
with a lot of visual observation data.  There was an experiment with 25 lbs of sodium that was 
90% consumed in 20 minutes.  However, there was trouble with the heat flux measurements.  
Malet et al. presented experiments for sodium pool fires that had similar results to that of the 
sodium spray fire experiments.  The maximum amount of aerosolized sodium was 45% of the 
initial sodium mass and 52% of the burnt sodium was in the peroxide form.  One of the 
differences was Malet et al. noted that the thickness of the pool did not have an effect on the 
combustion rate. Again, a lot of the experimental work did not record the boundary conditions 
well enough for the state-of-the-art fire modeling that is being developed today.  These 
experiments will be used for comparison with new experiments  
 
With respect to the work presented on the sodium pool fire computer models, it was 
difficult to completely understand what the models could do without access to the user’s 
manuals.  The user’s manuals were difficult to find in the literature, although efforts to obtain 
these documents will continue.  More research into these models is needed to benchmark the 
addition of sodium fire expertise into the current fire modeling codes.   
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This report documents the results of the initial stage of the “Metal Fire Implications for 
Advanced Reactors” Laboratory Directed Research and Development project. Efforts to date 
have included an extensive literature search to cover the sodium fire recorded accidents, the 
proposed LMFBR designs and safety concerns and sodium fire combustion experiments and 
research.   
 
Past experiences/accidents with sodium fires at nuclear and non-nuclear sodium facilities 
were investigated to identify the types of hazards that must be accounted for when designing the 
next generation of sodium-cooled nuclear reactors. The risk of sodium release and fire exists 
primarily during the three stages of a reactor lifetime; startup, day-to-day operation, and 
refueling and maintenance.  Utilizing past experience to develop suitable safety systems and 
procedures will minimize the chance of sodium leaks and the associated consequences in the 
next generation of sodium-cooled reactors. 
 
A need also exists to improve the state-of-the-art fire modeling codes to include the 
sodium fire combustion phenomenon.  The past experiments did not record the details of the 
boundary conditions for both pool and spray fire scenarios.  A lot of the experiments were small 
scale compared to the amount of sodium that could be involved in a HCDA. There exists a need 
to understand the phenomenon of inter-droplet interactions in a spray fire scenario.  There has 
not been any experimental work to address this.  Fire is one of the key parameters in a NPP risk 
analysis.  With the GNEP program making progress forward, expertise in metal fires is essential 
for Sandia National Laboratories.     
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7. APPENDIX A: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Berte, M. et al, 2007, Radioactive Sodium Waste Treatment and Conditioning: Review of  
Main Aspects, IAEA-TECDOC-1534. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 
Austria. 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the hazards associated with sodium waste 
management.  Roughly half of the document focuses on sodium waste generating, handling, and 
treatment processes. This includes draining sodium and NaK from plant systems; in situ 
treatment of residual sodium; cutting techniques for pumps, valves, piping and other 
components; cleaning of components; potential reuse of sodium; and removal of selected 
radionuclides from sodium waste with the objective of reducing the waste classification or 
converting it to exempt waste. The review includes both successes, failures, and failure analysis.  
Throughout the publication, emphasis is placed on industry experience and application of sodium 
and NaK.  This paper is especially useful in identifying the potential hazards and hazard 
mitigation considerations. 
 
Buksah, Y.K.,  et al, 1997, Operation Experience of the BN-600 Fast Reactor, in Nuclear  
Engineering and Design, vol. 173, p. 67-79 
 
 This paper discusses the operating experience of the BN-600 power plant, which has 
operated since 1980 in Russia.  The BN-600 is a pool-type 600 MWe reactor with oxide fuel.  
The bulk of the paper discusses details of the reactor system performance and operational 
experience.  There is also a good discussion of abnormal events, including sodium leaks.  Over 
its operational lifetime, the plant experienced numerous sodium leaks and associated fires.  
These leaks predominantly occurred in the early years of reactor operation.  The main causes of 
sodium leaks at this plant are pipelines, valves, flange joints, and human error.  It was found that 
manufacturing defects and design faults were the primary root cause of the component failures. 
 
Chang, Y.I., P.J. Finck, and C. Grandy, 2006, Advanced Burner Test Reactor  
Preconceptual Design Report, ANL-ABR-1 (ANL-AFCI-173). Argonne National 
Laboratory, Argonne, IL. 
 
The Advanced Breeder Test Reactor (ABTR), developed by ANL, is a sodium-cooled, 
pool-type reactor based on experience gained from the EBR-II reactor.  It is a 95 MWe design 
with an estimated 38 percent plant efficiency.  It has such low power because it was developed as 
a test bed for a similar commercial design-the Advanced Breeder Reactor.  This paper provides 
very detailed engineering descriptions of plant components and systems and contains numerous 
diagrams of these components.  These systems include the reactor core, sodium heat exchangers, 
power conversion, fuel handling, and instrumentation.  It also has an evaluation of the safety 
design criteria for the reactor. 
 
 
Cherdron, W. & S. Jordan, 1982, Physical and Chemical Characterization of Sodium  
Fire Aerosols. Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Laboratorium fur Aerosolphsik und 
Filtertechnik, 7500 Karlsruhe, West Germany (pp 77-79). 
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This paper is one of several that describe the pool and spray fire tests done in the 
FAUNA facility.  The only difference here is that the results were used to see how well the code 
PARDISEKO is with calculating aerosol behavior.  “The PARDISEKO code calculates accurate 
the course of the aerosol mass concentration using an instantaneous source of a definite initial 
aerosol concentration” within a containment vessel.  This paper points out the importance of a 
better understanding of aerosol behavior for pool fires.  This paper identifies things that seem 
simple that can possibly have a drastic effect on the aerosol behavior; including the relative 
humidity, turbulent convection, chemical composition, and other ambient environmental issues 
not accounted for. 
 
Cherdron, W., Dr. S. Jordan, & W. Lindner, 1984, Sodium Fire Particles-Chemical  
 Transformation and Properties. Liquid Metal Engineering and Technology,  
 Proceedings of the Third International Conference held in Oxford on 9-13 April  
 1984 (Vol 2: 287-290). 
 
 This report again also references the tests that were done in the FAUNA facility.  There is 
more investigation on the aerosol aerodynamic mass median diameter and how it is affected by 
relative humidity.  At relative humidity less than 20%, the aerodynamic mass median diameter 
for sodium fire aerosols in the combustion zone were about 1 μm and for relative humidity 
greater than 50% the aerodynamic mass medium diameter was measured to be about 2 μm.  
These experiments also have “shown that sodium fire aerosols convert relatively fast from 
sodium hydroxide to sodium carbonate in normal atmospheres”. About 50% of the sodium that 
went airborne is converted to carbonate after only 1 minute.  “The conversion rate depends 
strongly on the relative humidity.” It was shown that after 260 seconds, with relative humidity 
greater than 50% almost the entire airborne sodium was converted to sodium carbonate.  On the 
contrary with relative humidity less than 10%, only 20% of the airborne sodium was converted to 
carbonate. It was also mentioned that sodium hydroxide particles convert faster to sodium 
carbonate relative to their size; that is, the smaller particles convert faster than larger particles.   
 
 
Cherdron, W. & J. Charpenel, 1985a, Thermodynamic Consequences of Sodium Spray  
 Fires in Closed Containments, Part 1-Experiments. Laboratorium für  
Aerosolphysik und Filtertechnik, Kernforschungszentrum, Karlsruhe.   
 
 This report presents large-scale sodium spray fire experiments performed at the FAUNA 
facility. The objective of these experiments was to look at the containment pressure rise with a 
core disruptive accident resulting in a sodium spray into an oxygen-containing atmosphere.  
Overall, the total pressure did not go above 1.8 bars with a spray of 60kg of sodium in only 1.5 
seconds.  A lot of the heat was assumed to be absorbed by the walls in the experiments due to the 
large uncertainties in the results.  There is a lot of experimental data presented in this report in 
the forms of tables and graphs.  This will be a good report to compare new experimental data 
with.   
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Cherdron, W. & J. Charpenel, 1985b, Thermodynamic Consequences of Sodium Spray  
 Fires in Closed Containments, Part 2-Calculations with PULSAR. Laboratorium  
für Aerosolphysik und Filtertechnik, Kernforschungszentrum, Karlsruhe.   
 
This report is the second of two parts for this work with the FAUNA experiments.  Here 
the computer code PULSAR is compared to the experiments.  PULSAR is a “bidimensional code 
designed to calculate the thermodynamic consequences and the release of aerosols from burning 
sprayed sodium in confined atmosphere”.  The code predicts the overall pressure rise well, but 
the burning rate is under predicted. There is a need for improvement in the oxygen-consumption 
model.  The PULSAR code’s droplet combustion model is “described using the Spalding theory 
connected to the d2 law for computing the variations in the droplet radii” which brings up another 
limitation with sodium spray combustion models. 
 
Cherdron, W., 1986, Experimental Results of Large-Scale Sodium Spray Fires. Science  
And Technology of Fast Reactor Safety. BNES, London, 75-77. 
 
Experiments performed in containment at the FAUNA Facility are presented here.  These 
experiments replicated a small leak with a pressure release of sodium creating a spray pattern.  
The results were temperature and pressure rise over time graphs.  The flow rate, amount of 
sodium and nozzles were varied in the experiments.  There was no capture of the energy or heat 
release rate of the sodium.  The maximum pressure increase that was observed was 2 bar. Peak 
temperatures were observed to exceed 900°C but there was a concern noted that the local gas 
temperature could be dependent on height.  It was noted it took about 300 seconds to get an 
averaged value for temperature in the vessel.  They also collected data on the sodium 
concentration in air and found that there was a “fast decrease of the mass concentration which 
reaches less than 10 gr Na/m3 after 11 minutes.  It has been found, that the aerosol consists of 
nearly 100% sodium-peroxide”. 
 
Cherdron, W. & S. Jordan, 1988, Aerosol Release from Sodium Fires and their  
 Consequences for Reactor Components. International Atomic Energy Agency  
 International Working Group Fast Reactors, Specialists’ Meeting, Sodium Fires. 
 Obninsk, USSR, June 6-9, pp 44-56. Report Numbers XA0201146-1171,  
IWGFR/67. 
  
Here there are experiments presented that were performed the FAUNA facilities that 
were discussed in the “Sodium Fire Research Programs for SNR Safety in the FRG” also written 
by Cherdron. There was some data on the aerodynamic mass median diameter of the sodium fire 
particles for both open-to-atmosphere and closed-containment fires. It was shown that the 
particles measured only a few mm above the pool fire flame zone were only slightly different 
from the particles measured a few meters above the pool fire.  
 
Cherdron, W. & K Freudenstien, 1988, Sodium Fire Research Programs for SNR Safety  
in the FRG. International Atomic Energy Agency International Working Group  
Fast Reactors, Specialists’ Meeting, Sodium Fires. Obninsk, USSR, June 6-9, pp 38-42. 
Report Numbers XA0201148-1171. 
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 This paper describes a sodium fire research program called KfK at the Nuclear Research 
Center is Karlsruhe, Germany. There were pool fire experiments with “pool areas up to 12m2 and 
up to 500kg of sodium with a sodium inlet temperature of 500°C”. There were also combined 
fire experiments that were done in the FAUNA facility.  It was used to simulate an accident of a 
sodium leak inside insulation.  The understanding is that the sodium would fill the insulation and 
then cause the shield to break so the sodium release would not be an overpressure-spray release. 
Sodium spray fires were also performed in the FAUNA vessel to simulate a leakage in a sodium 
pipe.  As mentioned previously sodium in a normal atmosphere will ignite and cause a fast 
temperature and pressure increase.  The computer code PARDISEKO IV was developed for 
aerosol behavior.  This code predicts the evolution of the “polydisperse aerosol system in a 
closed containment” and “a deposition process by natural turbulent convection”.  There is also 
mention of the INTERATOM Gmbh , NABRAND code that was developed for a sodium leak 
fires.      
 
Gluekler, E.L. & T.C. Huang , 1979, Response of Secondary Containment to Presence of  
Sodium and Hydrogen. Nuclear Engineering and Design, North-Holland Publishing 
Company  (55:283-291). 
 
 This paper addresses issues that are “expected to present a major challenge to 
containment integrity”.  These are “short-term pressurization by sodium spray or pool fires 
following energetic ejection on sodium into the containment” and “long-term pressurization by 
sodium vapor and hydrogen after failure of the reactor vessel and guard tank”. This paper 
describes in some detail a postulated low-probability core disruptive accident.  The computer 
codes SOFIRE and CACECO are introduced for the evaluating the hydrogen generation rates.   
The codes SRAY and SOMIX are introduced for evaluating sodium spray fires inside the 
containment building and its consequences.  The paper focuses on the hydrogen production and 
buildup from a release of liquid sodium.  The lower flammability limit of hydrogen with air is as 
low as 4%.  Limiting the amount of hydrogen buildup would be useful to avoid the potential of a 
hydrogen explosion inside containment. This research showed that a hydrogen explosion does 
not “follow energetic events because of the early oxygen depletion by sodium fires”.  In the 
event of a melt-through “hydrogen recombination in the containment following sodium jet 
ignition, may not deplete the oxygen rapidly enough”.  It is recommended that purging the 
containment atmosphere could avoid this.   
 
Heisler, M. & H.A. Morewitz, 1979, An Investigation of Containment Pressurization by  
 Spray Fires. Nuclear Engineering and Design (55:219-224). 
 
This study took a hypothetical core disruptive accident (HCDA) and looked at how it 
would affect the secondary containment structure.  The SOMIX-1 sodium spray fire code was 
used in this study.  For light metal fast breeder reactors the HCDA for this case is “produced by 
arbitrarily inserting unrealistically large amounts of reactivity in a short period of time…..in 
principle, generate a large bubble of vaporized fuel, cladding, and coolant which can then cause 
the upper sodium pool to impact at high velocity on the bottom of the reactor vessel head and 
thereby damage the seals and loosen the plugs so that the pool sodium, followed by the contents 
of the HCDA bubble, can vent into the secondary containment atmosphere”. A hydraulic 
analysis was done for two different pressure scenarios of gas bubbles, the first case was a 20 atm 
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pressure rise that decayed to 2 atm in 10 seconds and the second case was a 5 atm pressure rise 
that decayed to 2 atm in 10 seconds time.   From this, 6 atm was calculated to be the maximum 
pressure rise assuming all the oxygen was consumed in the containment building.  This 
calculation is based on work by Humphreys.  It is not practical for all of the oxygen in the 
containment to be consumed, so the actual pressure rise is going to be lower than the maximum 
calculated pressure rise.  The overall physical dynamics of how the spray fire works in relation to 
the different temperature layers is discussed.  The hot gases are going to rise and the sodium will 
fall to the lower part of containment, which means there is going to be some type of cooling 
effect with a sodium spray fire scenario. 
 
Himeno, Y. et al., 1988,  Development and Demonstration of Sodium Fire Mitigation  
System in the SAPFIRE Facility. International Atomic Energy Agency International 
Working Group Fast Reactors, Specialists’ Meeting, Sodium Fires. Obninsk, USSR, June 
6-9, pp 135-148. Report Numbers XA0201155. 
 
Leak tests were performed in the SAPFIRE Facility with 2.4 tons of Na that was heated 
to 505C with a flow rate of 3.1kg/s for 13 minutes.  The cameras and pictures showed that the 
flow was more of a downward column pattern with no ignition. There were rebound droplets 
from the floor that ignited. About 4% of the sodium burnt during the test compared to other spray 
tests that have shown 30% of the sodium burnt in the test. There was examination done after the 
test and it “revealed no failure of the jackets and no burning of the thermal insulator around the 
pipe”.  The combustion rate for both the open pool and the smothering tank with an opening of 
ratio of 1% were determined.  The combustion rate for the smothering tank with an opening ratio 
of 1% was only about 3% of the combustion rate for the open pool.  
 There were tests to see how the integrity of the structural concrete would hold-up during 
a sodium leak accident.  The tests used gas burners to heat the steel lining.  The thermocouple 
that was at a depth of 500 mm never got above 80C during the test.  The steel liner was heated to 
about 500C to represent the previous test temperatures.  Steam that was released from the heating 
of the concrete was vented, but the effects of the steam on increasing a sodium fire energy 
released was not taken into account.  There were also tests done to see if the aerosol deposition 
in the pipes would affect the heat exchanger and electrical instrumentation.  There were no 
significant findings that would prove to pose a threat to the electrical instrumentation.  There was 
a relationship found between the heat transfer coefficient and the average weight of the aerosols, 
as the weight increased the heat transfer coefficient decreases.  The figure referenced for this has 
six data points and a curved fit to it.     
 
Ichimiya, M., T. Mizuno, and S. Kotake, 2007, A Next Generation Sodium-Cooled Fast  
Reactor Concept and its R&D Program, in Nuclear Engineering and Technology, vol. 39, 
no. 3, p. 171-186. 
 
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Sodium Fast Reactor (JSFR) is a sodium-
cooled, advanced loop-type reactor evolved from Japanese fast reactor technologies.  It is a 1500 
MWe design with an estimated 42 percent plant efficiency.  The JSFR design uses a trans-uranic, 
mixed oxide (TRU-MOX) fuel with a fast spectrum flux to achieve breakeven burn-up.  The 
paper provides a brief overview of the design with some good diagrams and detailed plant 
specification tables.  Three primary areas are being improved upon with this design.  The first is 
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the reduction of construction cost.  The second is an improvement in core performance 
characteristics such as the breeding capability, actinide burning characteristics, fuel burn-up, and 
operation cycle length.  The third target area for improvement is sodium safety.  It is concluded 
that the engineered safety features overcome the inherent danger of working with sodium in this 
design. 
 
Johnson, R.P. et al., 1968, Characterization of Sodium Pool Fires. Proceedings of the  
 International Conference on Sodium Technology and Large Fast Reactor  
 Design, Part I, Sessions on Sodium Technology, Argonne National Laboratory,  
 ANL-7520, pp. 195-205. 
 
This paper provides a description of the state of knowledge in 1968.  There are 
descriptions of the basic physics and limiting processes in sodium pool fires. The authors 
identify three primary things that the burning rate depends on.  These are the “rate of oxygen 
arrival to the burning region”, “rate of reaction of oxygen with sodium”, and “diffusion of 
sodium vapor through the oxide layer to the burning region”.  The authors then go into describe 
the four regions for a simple sodium pool fire.  They are trying to prove that the heat balance for 
a simple model is somewhat of a difficult task.   There are also suggestions for further research 
including variations in the spill areas, sodium temperature, and oxygen concentration that were 
the subjects of subsequent studies in the 70’s and 80’s.   
 
Jordan, S. et al, 1988, Sodium Aerosol Behavior in Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactor  
 Containments. Nuclear Technology, (81:183-192). 
 
This was a group effort with five countries involved to study the evaporation process of 
sodium oxides in a fire.  In a contained space, about 40% of the burnt sodium in aerosolized in a 
pool fire.  The relationship between the sodium burning rate and the aerosol production rate is 
significantly different depending on the magnitude of the air convective movement.  For 
anything but a sodium pool fire (sodium spray, column, or combined fire) it is suggested that the 
“aerosol production rate by combustion is equal to the combustion rate”.  The aerosol mass mean 
diameter (AMMD) for sodium pool fire is seen to increase rapidly because of the high 
concentrations (0.5 μm to 1 μm).  It decreases after several hours. The table in the report (Table 
II), “EMIS Experiment Variation of Aerosol Production Rate,” that shows how the production 
rate of aerosols varies with different stages of sodium combustion for a pool fire provides 
important data.  This report again mentions the difficulties with environmental effects on sodium 
combustion and the differences in aerosol formation being greatly effect by the relative humidity.   
 
King, R.W., 1999, Considerations for Advanced Reactor Design Based on EBR-II  
Experience, ANL/ED/CP-99117.  Argonne National Laboratory-West, Idaho Falls, ID, 
October 1999. 
 
 EBR-II, a pool-type, sodium-cooled reactor and power plant, operated for thirty years 
(beginning in 1964) as a proof-of concept demonstration plant, a fuels and materials test and 
irradiation facility, and an operational test bed for liquid-metal reactor components. It also served 
as an operational safety transient testing facility, and finally as a prototype for the Integral Fast 
Reactor program.  The paper discusses the key features of EBR-II that contributed to its 
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reliability and concludes that many of these features must be incorporated into the next 
generation of sodium-cooled reactors.  It also addresses how cost considerations must play a role 
in moving forward with sodium reactor development. 
 
King, T.L., R.R. Landry, E.D. Throm, and J.N. Wilson, 1991, Preapplication Safety  
Evaluation Report for the Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR) Liquid-Metal Reactor, 
NUREG-1369.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
  
The SAFR reactor was designed in the late 1980s.  The standard SAFR design consists of 
four reactor modules, each with a thermal output of 900 MWth.  The core is fueled by a metallic 
U-Pu-Zr alloy and is cooled by flowing liquid sodium.  This report is a preliminary technical 
evaluation of the safety features generated by the NRC as part of the design review for the 
reactor.  An overview of the reactor and balance of plant designs is included, with emphasis on 
safety concerns for each component.  Accident analyses are provided for design-basis accidents, 
and additional details of these analyses are provided in the appendices. The paper also includes 
recommendations for research and development programs required to support the design.  
Although DOE terminated work on the SAFR design in 1988, this document provides a complete 
review of the safety features designed up to that time.  
 
Krolikowski, Theresa S., 1968, Violently Sprayed Sodium-Air Reaction in an Enclosed  
 Volume, ANL-7472.  Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.  
 
This report presents the results of pressure-driven sodium spray experiments that were 
performed along with a mathematical model that was developed for a single spherical sodium 
particle.  These experiments measured the pressure rise in the closed reaction chamber.  Ten 
grams of liquid sodium between the temperatures of 350 and 425C were injected into the 
chamber.  The pressure in which it was driven in through the nozzle ranged from 1000-1500psig.  
The pressure rise rates were measured between 25 and 75 atm/sec with measured pressures of 1.6 
to 4.1 atm. The reaction rate was drastically affected by the size of the spray particle, while the 
spray velocity had a moderate effect.  There was a small effect on the reaction rate with respect 
to oxygen concentrations.  The mathematical model presented was for a single spherical droplet 
of sodium through air.  The report goes into detail about the derivation and the assumptions put 
forth for this model.   
 
 
Kubo, S., Y. Hashiguchi, and A. Okabe, 1996, R&D Needs for Evaluation of Sodium  
Fire Consequences and Aerosol Behavior for DFBR, in Technical Committee Meeting on 
Evaluation of Radioactive Materials Release and Sodium Fires in Fast Reactors, Ibaraki, 
Japan, November 11-14, 1996. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
 
This paper discusses the research and development requirements to evaluate consequence 
and aerosol behavior of sodium fires.  It is specifically written to assist in the design of the 
Japanese Demonstration Fast Breeder Reactor (DFBR).  It first discusses general safety 
principles used to mitigate sodium leaks and reduce the consequences of leaks that do occur.  
These principles are discussed in detail and include tabulated summaries.  Current design 
concepts for sodium fire prevention are then discussed.  These include measures used inside and 
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outside of containment, early detection, and aerosol prevention.  Finally, an evaluation of the 
sodium fire safety of the DFRB design is provided.  This evaluation is fairly detailed and 
includes results from sodium fire models, such as the CONTAIN code developed at SNL. 
 
Leibowitz, L., 1967, Thermodynamic Equilibria in Sodium-Air Systems, Journal of  
 Nuclear Materials 23, North-Holland Publishing Co., pp 233-235. 
 
 This author took some work done by White, Johnson, and Dantzig and expanded it with a 
new computer program that tries to minimize free energy.  These are pressure calculations for 
containment in the case of a sodium leak.  Varying the atmospheric conditions brought about 
different results.  This report does not introduce new topics for this report, but some of the 
references can be looked into.   
  
Lhiaubet, G. et al, 1990, Comparison of Aerosol Behavior Codes with Experimental  
Results from a Sodium Fire in a Containment. 1990 International Fast Reactor  
Safety  Meeting, Snowbird, UTAH (pp 1-13). 
 
This is a study of a comparison of four codes and how well they predict typical data from 
aerosol production from experiments done in CEN-Cadarache, France. These experiments were 
sodium fires in a 400 m3 vessel that lasted 90 minutes with measurements taken over a 10 hour 
period. The codes that were compared were PARDISEKO, AEROSIM, CONTAIN, and 
AEROSOLS/B2.  The results of this showed a “discrepancy between calculated and 
experimental results ranges from a factor of 3.5 to a factor of 20” which can be accounted for by 
the wall depositions being significantly underestimated by all of the codes.   
 
Lineberry, M.J. and T.R. Allen, 2002, The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR).   
Americas Nuclear Energy Symposium, Coral Gables, FL, October 16-18, 2002. 
 
The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) system, developed by the INL for the Generation IV 
program, features a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled pool-type reactor.  The fuel cycle employs a 
full actinide recycle with two major options.  These options use various fuel types, reactor power 
levels, and cycle lengths.  As this reactor was in the early stages of development, the paper does 
not provide large amounts of detail regarding the engineering design.  However, the general 
design principles are discussed.  The SFR is designed for management of high-level wastes and, 
in particular, management of plutonium and other actinides. Important safety features of the 
system include a long thermal response time, a large margin to coolant boiling, a pool-type 
primary system that operates near atmospheric pressure, and intermediate sodium system 
between the radioactive sodium in the primary system and the water and steam in the power 
plant. 
  
Luster, V.P. and K.F. Freudenstein, 1996, Feedback from Practical Experience with  
Large Sodium Fire Accidents, in Technical Committee Meeting on Evaluation of 
Radioactive Materials Release and Sodium Fires in Fast Reactors, O-aria, Ibaraki, Japan, 
November 11-14, 1996. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
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This paper discusses the Almeria and ILONA sodium fire accidents in detail.  The 
Almeria solar plant accident occurred in August 1986 at a test facility near Almeria, Spain. Prior 
to the accident, the plant was shut down to repair a leaking sodium valve.  The valve was to be 
repaired under a gas pressure of 5.1 bar.  An auxiliary seal failed during repair, sending a strong 
sodium jet into the room and creating a violent sodium spray fire.  Several personnel were 
injured during the event, and the fire was able to propagate to adjacent rooms. 
ILONA was a large sodium test facility of natural convection in decay heat removal loops 
located at Bensberg, Germany (Luster 1996).  The facility consists of a tower-shaped building of 
steel framework construction on a concrete basement.  A sodium fire and a severe sodium-
concrete interaction occurred in September 1992 at an auxiliary installation in the basement of 
the ILONA site.  The leak initiated when a failure in the pressure regulation valves caused 
control gas to become unavailable.  The increasing gas pressure partially opened a gland plug, 
causing a slow (~0.2 kg/s) leak of sodium.  Sodium continued to leak from the vessel for five 
hours, ultimately releasing 4300 kg.  Spilled sodium came in contact with the concrete floor and 
walls, initiating a sodium-concrete reaction.  The concrete of the floor was lifted by reaction 
products and the thermal expansion of the reinforcing steel.  Subsequent investigation revealed 
much about the sodium-concrete interaction and the thermal impact of hot reaction gas on 
unprotected concrete.   
 
Makino, Atsushi, 2006 Ignition Delay and Limit of Ignitability for Sodium Pool (Theory 
and Experimental Comparisons).” JSME International Journal, Series B, Vol. 49, No. 1.  
 
 This study focuses on the parameters that affect the ignition delay of a sodium pool based 
on the premise that ignition prevention is the ultimate goal.  Makino has identified parameters 
through the application of perturbation theory that if they remain controlled, it will make igniting 
a sodium pool more difficult.  Along with a dependence on temperatures, oxidizer concentration 
and heat losses, the study pointed out that ignition is inhibited with reduced surface-to-volume 
ratio for the pool; that is, a pool that is thermally massive relative to the available surface area 
will be more difficult to heat further.  The model is successful at predicting ignition criteria for 
several different sodium pool data sets, including several from the Japanese language literature.   
 
 
Makino, Atsushi, 2005 Ignition and Combustion of a Falling, Single Sodium droplet.” Proc. 
Combust. Instut., Vol. 31, pp 20747—2054.   
 
This paper presents experimental measurements for sodium droplet ignition along with a 
model for ignition based on activation-energy asymptotics.  The parameters that directly affect 
the ignition delay for a droplet are the oxygen concentration, the initial speed of the droplet, the 
initial diameter of a droplet, and the temperature.  Model predictions are compared with the 
experimental data sets and good agreement is indicated. 
 
Malet, J.C. et al., 1981, Potential Results of Spray and Pool Fires. Nuclear Engineering  
and Design , North-Holland Publishing Company (68:195-206). 
 
This paper presents a series of sodium pool ignition and fire experiments and a series of 
sodium spray fire experiments.  For pool fires, results are presented for burning rate dependence 
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on sodium temperature, pool geometry, oxygen concentration and humidity, although the data 
presented is incomplete from the perspective of being able to define boundary conditions for 
simulations.  Pool fire experimental results were compared with results obtained using the 
FEUNA code, although the conditions used for the model were not defined.  Spray fire 
measurements were also reported in terms of temperature and oxygen concentrations as a 
function of time, although the paper indicates that inhomogeneities result in large (unspecified) 
uncertainties.  Spray measurements are compared with the PULSAR code.    As before the 
conditions for the spray fires are not well defined.  
 
Mikami, H., A. Shono, and H. Hiroi, 1996, Sodium Leak at Monju (I)-Cause and  
Consequences, in Technical Committee Meeting on Evaluation of Radioactive Materials 
Release and Sodium Fires in Fast Reactors, O-aria, Ibaraki, Japan, November 11-14, 
1996. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
 
 The Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor first reached criticality in 1994.  Powered 
operation was begun in 1995, and a series of power raising tests were performed, with a planned 
full-power test planned for June 1996.  Monju is a loop-type 280 MWe sodium-cooled reactor 
with mixed oxide fuel.  During a scheduled power rating test (40% electrical power) on 
December 8, 1995, a leak occurred in a damaged temperature sensor.  The paper describes the 
failure mechanism in detail, discusses the procedure for diagnosing the leak, and details the work 
done to prevent such an accident from occurring again.   
 The work done to prevent another accident is discussed in detail.  In addition to replacing 
all similarly designed temperature sensors, aspects of sodium fire response and emergency 
operation procedures were also modified at the Monju site.  This work resulted in the Monju 
Improvement Plan, which is detailed in the paper.  The Monju plant is scheduled to resume 
operation in mid-2008. 
 
Miyagi, K. & S. Miyahara, Development of In-Vessel Source Term Analysis Code,  
 TRACER.  Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corportation,  
 XA0055534, pp 161-168. 
 
The TRACER code models behavior of fission products through the sodium pool when a 
postulated fuel breakage occurs.  This article does not include information about metal 
combustion, so in terms of necessary information for understanding metal fires this report might 
be of use for cited references. 
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Miyake, Osamu et al., 1991, Sodium Pool Combustion Codes for Evaluation of Fast  
 Breeder Reactor Safety. Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 28[2], 
 pp 107-121. 
 
The SOFIRE-MII, ASSCOPS, and SPM sodium pool combustion codes are described 
and were validated against large-scale experiments that were performed in Japan at the SAPFIRE 
facility and in KfK in the FAUNA facility.  The SOFIRE-MII and ASSCOPS codes have the 
conventional combustion models in them, where the combustion happens at the pool surface.  
The SPM uses a flame combustion model which is more sophisticated. As of when the report 
was written, the authors claim that no other sodium combustion codes have been validated 
against large-scale experiments.  The specifics of these combustion models for the three codes 
are described in some detail.  The results of the validation effort showed that all three codes can 
predict the overall combustion process “reasonably well”. Although SPM has a more 
sophisticated combustion model, this validation effort did not reveal the difference in the overall 
combustion process predictions.   
 
Newman, R.N., 1972, The Ignition and Combustion of Sodium-A Review, Central  
 Electricity Generating Board, Research Department, Berkley Nuclear 
 Laboratories (RDBN2229). 
 
This paper reviews knowledge of sodium combustion and ignition as it stood in 1972.  
There is particular attention to the properties of surface oxide layers and the role that their 
coherence plays in inhibiting ignition.  To this end Newman discusses the oxide layers that form 
in different oxidizing environments.  The paper points out the importance of surface burning in 
the combustion process.  While vapor phase burning can occur and is expected based on 
thermodynamic considerations, substantial heat losses present in pool fires commonly lead to 
surface burning.  Newman discusses the thermochemistry of sodium oxidation products and 
intermediates and also the spectral signatures of sodium combustion.  Newman also has a more 
recent review described below.  
  
Newman, R.N. et al., 1973, Explosive Interactions Between Sodium and Water, and 
 Material Wastage in the Vicinity of Leaks in Sodium Water Heat Exchangers.  
 Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories. Proceedings of the International Conference,  
 Liquid Alkali Metals, British Nuclear Energy Society, London, England, April 
 4-6, pp 85-91.  
 
There is a lot of experimental work explained here.  The two main areas that are 
discussed are, the sodium water interactions under certain conditions causing an explosion and 
the material decomposition that can lead to a leak in a heat exchanger.  An explosion can occur 
with a hot metal and water interaction, the “greater surface area of the assembly of particles over 
that of the original metal results in a high rate of heat transfer which in turn produces steam 
explosively”.   The concern is corrosion in the heat exchanger when water and sodium interact.  
From this reaction sodium hydroxide can form and with water vapor at high temperatures, 
corrosion can occur.  This can possibly even happen at micron levels. 
  
Newman, R.N., 1982, The Role of Carbon Dioxide in the Combustion of Sodium in Air.  
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 Proceedings of the L.M.F.B.R. Safety Topical Meeting, Central Electricity  
Generating Board, Ecully, France, Volume III, pp III-3-III-11. 
 
This paper presents experimental work on small sodium pool fires in different 
atmospheres (varying the CO2 levels) to identify the role of CO2 in inhibition.  Structures 
observed on the pool surface that support the oxide layer are identified as containing carbon 
derived from reactions between sodium and carbon dioxide.  This observation is linked to the 
effectiveness of carbon or graphite based fre suppressants.  It is also observed that at certain pool 
temperatures (above 600 C) the carbon may oxidize and also release additional sodium oxide 
aerosols.  The pool fire experiments were pools the size between 10 cm and 30 cm in diameter 
and up to 15 cm in depth.       
This report is helpful as it describes in detail the physical nature of what was going on 
during the experiments.  Things like surface layer formation and small fires over the pool were 
discussed.  These experiments showed that extinction can occur with the right amount of inert 
gas, the complication is designing for the right pool size in an accident scenario, in order to 
obtain the right concentrations.  These experiments are small scale, so the issue of extrapolating 
to a much larger scale still exists.     
 
Newman, R.N., 1983, The Ignition and Burning Behaviour of Sodium Metal in Air.  
Progress in Nuclear Energy, CEGB, Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories, Berkeley, 
Gloucestershire, U.K.. (12, 2: 119-147). 
 
This paper discusses some physical and thermochemical properties of liquid sodium, 
relating them to the thermal balance that determines the nature of the combustion process.  The 
knowledge of specific kinetics is also presented.  The authors other work, described in the above 
paragraphs, is also extensively reviewed.  In addition to the topics noted above, there are sections 
on vapor-phase jet flames, spray flames, larger pool fires (both unconfined and confined) and 
sodium fire suppression techniques. The fact that sodium is chemically reactive with both water 
and oxygen in the atmosphere is mentioned in many papers including this one.  Newman states 
“most spillage of liquid sodium can be expected to result in a fire” given the temperatures of 
operation in a reactor.  There has been a lot of effort in hydrocarbon fire research.  There has 
been a good amount of sodium fire research but much of it is basic focusing on the burning of 
sodium with respect to scale.  A lot of the effort has focused on developing codes but their 
predictions were not reviewed specifically. “A major part of this review is a presentation of the 
large amount of quantitative data on the burning rates of sodium sub-divided according to the 
physical form of the element…The end objective of the studies described is of course to be able 
to deal with sodium spillages as a potential large-scale industrial hazard.”  
There is little information about the surface combustion within the sodium air flames.  
This is because a separation can not be made between the vapor phase reaction occurring in 
parallel.  Again the issue of the formation non-homogenous surface with the oxide wick structure 
adds another level of difficulty.    
There is talk about the flame height for a sodium jet in the vapor combustion section.  
There are a couple standard referenced flame height correlations mentioned, but these can only 
be used for sodium to “quantify the behavior of coherent laminar or turbulent jets of sodium if 
sodium monoxide is considered as the major product”. The next section describes the droplet, 
sprays, and jet combustion.  For these cases the sodium is dispersed into a closed or semi-closed 
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vessel which results in a temperature and pressure rise. There is a lot of reference again to many 
different experiments that will be followed up on.   
 
Nowlen, S.P., M. Kazarians, and F. Wyant, 2001, Risk Methods Insights Gained from  
Fire Incidents, SAND2001-1676P.  Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 
 
 This report presents the findings of an effort to gain new fire PRA methodology insights 
from fire incidents that have occurred at nuclear power plants. A set of 25 fire incidents at 
nuclear power plants is analyzed to provide data for the review.  These incidents are also 
summarized in an appendix of the report.  The review focuses on two types of actions and 
events. The first are events that illustrate interesting insights regarding factors that fall within the 
scope of current fire PRA methods.  The second are events observed in actual fire incidents that 
fall outside the scope of current fire PRA methods. Fire PRA insights are then drawn based on 
these observations. The paper concludes that the overall structure of a typical fire PRA can 
appropriately capture the dominant factors involved in a fire incident. However, several areas of 
potential methodological improvement are identified. 
 
Ohno, S. et al., 1990, Test and Code Development for Evaluation of Sodium Fire  
Accidents in the FBRs. International Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, Power Reactor and 
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, Japan, pp 241-250. 
 
 This report talks about the development of the SOLFAS code and presents some sodium 
experimental results that were used.  The SOLFAS code is a three-dimensional code that consists 
of the fundamental conservation equations.  Sodium pool fire experiments performed in the 
FRAT-1 vessel in the SAPFIRE facility were referenced in this report.  The experimental results 
were compared to the SOFIRE-MII code.  The combustion rate was shown to be impacted by the 
sodium temperature in the experiments. The computation code however, estimates the 
combustion rate as a constant.   
 An overview of some sodium column fire experiments were also presented.  These tests 
showed that that there are three main factors that affect the columnar combustion rate.  These are 
the oxygen concentration, the sodium leak flow rate, and the collision velocity of sodium 
leakage.  At the time this report was written the SOFAS code was still undergoing more 
development. 
 
Plys, Martin G., Michael Epstien, & Boro Malinovic, 2000, Uranium Pyrophoricity  
 Phenomena and Prediction. Safety Analysis Working Group Workshop 2000, 
 Santa Fe, NM.  Fauske & Associates, Inc. SNF-6192-FP. 
 
There have been experiences with uranium pyrophoricity in DOE complexes in the past 
which have no capture the relevant physics of the phenomenon.  The idea of this paper is to 
compile a report that encompasses the work done on uranium pyrophoricity in order to have an 
understanding of what research is available. A heat transfer, mathematical model is presented for 
a piece of metallic fuel.  Both natural convection and radiation are considered.  There are 
postulated reaction rate correlations for uranium in different environments.  There are some 
incidents presented with the ignition of uranium. A deterministic approach is suggested here 
which includes all the potential scenarios where ignition can occur with uranium.  This document 
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is more of a procedural document in screening for these types of incidents and how to evaluate 
them.  For the purpose of investigating sodium fire, the only part of this report that is pertinent 
are the uranium incidents reported.    
 
Poplavsky, V.M. et al, 2004, Review of Fast Reactor Operational Experience Gained in  
the Russian Federation; Approaches to the Co-Ordinated Research Project, in 
Operational and Decommissioning Experience with Fast Reactors meeting, Cadarache, 
France, March 11-15, 2002.  International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
 
This paper summarizes the experience with operating sodium-cooled reactors gained in 
Russia.  This experience is largely based on the operation of the BR-5/10, BOR-60, and BN-600 
reactors.  For each reactor, a basic description of reactor parameters is provided.  A summary of 
the operating experience is then given, with a focus on abnormal events and sodium leak 
incidents.  Causes and consequences of sodium leaks are analyzed, and it is concluded that most 
problems arose early in the lifetime of each reactor.   
 The report concludes that the feasibility of sodium-cooled has been demonstrated in all 
portions of their life-cycle.  It further concludes that the operation of the BN-600 in particular 
demonstrates that advanced sodium-cooled reactors are a viable, cost-effective source of future 
energy.  Finally, it is concluded that safety of these reactors has been demonstrated. 
  
Randich, E. & A.U. Russell, 1983, Large Scale Exploratory Test of Sodium/Magnetite 
Concrete Interactions, SAND83-0356. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 
 
This report describes a test series performed at SNL to investigate concrete and sodium 
interactions.  This SAND report evaluates the two magnetite concrete experiments.  Experiment 
number 14 “incorporated a bare magnetite concrete crucible with a cylindrical cavity and a 
relatively shallow sodium pool (123 kg of sodium). The test was designed to examine the 
interaction between molten sodium at 82K and unprotected magnetite concrete”.  The other 
magnetite concrete experiment was test number 15 which was more complicated than test 14. 
“The test incorporated a square crucible cavity with a flawed steel liner and sued 243kg of 
sodium.  The purpose was to examine the attack of vertical magnetite concrete walls and 
insulating siliceous firebrick which were partially protected from the sodium by a steel plate 
containing flaws”. 
 These experiments showed that an energetic reaction is possible with molten sodium and 
magnetite concrete.  Temperatures as high as 1150K were recorded in the reaction zone.  A heat 
generation rate was calculated at maximum of 1.3x105 J/m2s and this was lower than what was 
seen in the limestone concrete experiments.  For the unprotected magnetite experiment number 
14 all of the sodium was consumed but the experimenters are not certain if the penetration into 
the floor would have gone further had there been more sodium to interact.  The maximum 
downward penetration was 11cm and the maximum observed penetration rate was 2.5 mm/min.  
Test experiment number 15 used firebrick which provided no protection for the magnetite 
concrete.  These experiments have shown that the interaction between molten sodium and 
magnetite concrete need to be considered in the design process because it is significant when the 
reactions occur.  There were no wall penetrations recorded for these experiments.       
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Randich, E., Smaardyk, J.E. & A.U.Russell, 1983, Large-Scale Exploratory Tests of  
Sodium/Limestone Concrete Interactions, SAND82-2315. Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM.  
 
This report evaluates experiments that were performed at SNL under the Advanced 
Reactor Safety Research Program, looking at the interactions between molten sodium and calcite 
concrete.   The results of 11 tests are presented in this report that took place between 1977-
1981.  Molten sodium was poured on top of concrete.  “The experiments were monitored for gas 
and aerosol evolution, temperatures in the sodium pool and concrete, and erosion rate of the 
concrete. The independent variables considered included sodium temperature, sodium pool 
depth, the effects of sodium hydroxide additions on the interactions, concrete construction 
methods, and concrete crucible geometry.” Any where from 20-200kg of molten sodium that was 
initially heated between 673 K and 973 K was used.   
 The conclusions from these experiments were that an energetic reaction can occur with 
the interaction of limestone concrete and molten sodium.  The maximum recorded temperature in 
the reaction zone was 1173 K but for only for a short time.  Heat fluxes were measured from 
3x104 to 4x105 J/m2s.  It was also noted that there is a threshold temperature for the sodium 
where an energetic reaction does not occur, this temperature threshold range is 723 K to 773 K. 
There was a delay time from when the molten sodium came into contact with the concrete; this 
could be because of the location of the thermocouple below the concrete surface.  The maximum 
observed delay time was recorded as 30 minutes.  As expected, hydrogen was the main gaseous 
specie produced from these experiments.  “A small amount of methane was present if the 
hydrogen concentration in the cover gas in the test article exceeded a composition of 30% 
hydrogen.” The downward penetration for these experiments were anywhere from 1cm to 15cm.  
This is comparable to the magnetite concrete experiments where the maximum downward 
penetration was 11cm.  “Ultrasonic techniques indicated penetration rates of from 1 to 4 mm/min 
for short periods of time.”  Those are maximum rates and the penetration rates are not steady.  
Some of the experiments ceased when all the sodium was consumed, while there were others that 
ceased before all the sodium was consumed.  “Only by understanding the mechanism by which 
penetration is occurring will a predictive capability be obtained for modeling the 
sodium/concrete interactions in reactor accident situations.”   
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Sakashita, Y., 2004, 4S Current Status.  2004 Alaska Rural Energy Conference,  
Talkeetna, AK, April 27-29, 2004. 
 
This presentation provides a top-level overview of the Toshiba 4S reactor.  The 4S 
reactor is a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled pool-type reactor.  Designs with power outputs ranging 
from 10 to 50 MWe have been proposed.  The 4S reactor is intended for use in remote locations 
and to operate without refueling during its 30-year life.  The 4S has been compared with a 
nuclear “battery” because it does not require refueling.  The lack of refueling would mean that 
the reactor’s fuel supply would be a capital cost rather than an operating cost.  The presentation 
also discusses additional potential applications for the 4S reactor, including desalination and 
hydrogen production. 
 
Suresh Kumar, K.V. et al, 2004, Fast Breeder Test Reactor; 15 Years of Operating  
Experience, in Operational and Decommissioning Experience with Fast Reactors 
meeting, Cadarache, France, March 11-15, 2002.  International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna, Austria. 
  
This paper overviews the operating experience of the FBTR.  The FBTR is a 40 MWth 
sodium-cooled loop-type reactor located in Kalpakkam, India.  It was designed to help the 
Indians gain experience in the design, construction, and operation of fast reactors and sodium 
systems.  The paper outlines the operating experience for the past 15 years, including issues with 
refueling, steam generators, sodium leaks, and reactor transients.  The paper concludes that the 
overall system performance has been satisfactory and the experience has provided incentive to 
move forward with the development of large fast reactors. 
 
Tucek, K., J. Carlsson, and H. Wider, 2006, Comparison of Sodium and Lead-Cooled  
Fast Reactors Regarding Reactor Physics Aspects, Severe Safety and Economical Issues, 
in Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 236, p. 1589-1598. 
 
 In this paper, two fast reactor systems are discussed and compared—the sodium-cooled 
fast reactor and the lead-cooled fast reactor.  First, comparative calculations on critical masses, 
fissile enrichments and burn-up swings of mid-sized SFRs and LFRs (600MWe) are presented.   
Further, reactivity transient events and decay heat removal failures were analyzed for both 
systems.  The calculations revealed that LFRs have an advantage over SFRs in coping with the 
investigated severe accident initiators (ULOF, ULOHS,TLOP). This is caused by the greater 
natural circulation behavior of LFR systems and the much higher boiling temperature of lead.  
The paper further concludes that the LFR has an economic advantage since it does not require an 
intermediate coolant circuit. However, it was also proposed to avoid an intermediate coolant 
circuit in an SFR by using a supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle.  
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Yoshida, E., S. Kato, and Y. Wada, 1995, Post-Corrosion and Metallurgical Analysis of  
Sodium Piping Materials Operated for 100,000 Hours, in Liquid Metal Systems. Edited 
by H.U. Borgstedt and G. Frees, Plenum Press, New York, NY 
 
This paper presents corrosion data for steel that has been exposed to sodium for 100,000 
hours.  In particular, surface corrosion morphology, microstructure, chemical composition, and 
high-temperature strength were evaluated after long-term exposure to sodium.  The paper 
overviews test procedures and results.  It was observed that thermal gradient mass transfer 
phenomenon seen during short-term tests continue during long-term exposure.  The paper 
concludes that long-term exposure of steel to sodium does not result in significant corrosion 
levels.  
 
Yuasa, Saburo, 1984, Spontaneous Ignition of Sodium in Dry and Moist Air Streams.  
 Twentieth Symposium (International) on Combustion, The Combustion Institute,  
 pp 1869-1876.  
 
This report presents some results of sodium pool burning experiments, but the 
explanation of the observed burning behavior and phases that sodium went through is more 
important for a fundamental understanding.  Yuasa mentions that there is a wide disparity of 
ignition temperatures reported for sodium.  He thinks it has a lot to do with the actual definition 
or criteria of the “ignition temperature” and there are a lot of concerns of how the sodium is 
stored prior to the experiment.  The state of the sodium metal before it burns can significantly 
impact the experimental results.  
 That whole process was for sodium in a dry air stream, for a moist air stream the 
observations were similar.  The appearance was different though.  “At the instant when the 
sample was exposed to the moist air stream, it was uniformly covered in a white film.”  Then 
soon after the sample’s film layer turned a yellow-greenish color.  Similar to transition I for the 
dry air stream, there were a number of small wrinkles along the surface and a large temperature 
increase.  These wrinkles then turned to a dark green color which was called transition II.  The 
temperature continued to increase and the film turned black and a small flame appeared near the 
center of the sample.  Comparing both the dry and moist air streams there is a HRR plot which 
doesn’t seem to show much difference between the two.   
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